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Abstract
Half of the jobs in the U.S. feature pay-for-performance. We study nonlinear in-
come taxation in a model where such labor contracts arise as a result of moral hazard
frictions within rms. We derive novel formulas for the incidence of arbitrarily nonlin-
ear reforms of a given tax code on both average earnings and their sensitivity to output
risk. We show theoretically and quantitatively that, following an increase in tax pro-
gressivity, the higher sensitivity of earnings to performance caused by the crowding-out
of private insurance is almost fully oset by a countervailing performance-pay eect
driven by labor supply responses. As a result, earnings risk is hardly aected by pol-
icy. We then turn to the normative analysis of a government that levies taxes and
transfers to redistribute income across workers with dierent levels of uninsurable pro-
ductivity. We nd that setting taxes without accounting for the endogeneity of private
insurance is close to optimal. Thus, the common concern that standard models of tax-
ation underestimate the cost of redistribution is, in the context of performance-based
compensation, overblown.
*We thank Árpád Ábrahám, Gadi Barlevy, Katherine Carey, Antoine Ferey, Xavier Gabaix,
Daniel Garrett, Louis Kaplow, Stefan Pollinger, Morten Ravn, Kjetil Storesletten, Florian Scheuer,
Karl Schulz, Stefanie Stantcheva, Aleh Tsyvinski, Hélène Turon, Venky Venkateswaran, Philipp
Wangner, and numerous seminar and conference participants, for helpful comments and suggestions.
Nicolas Werquin acknowledges support from ANR under grant ANR-17-EURE-0010 (Investissements
d'Avenir program).
Introduction
What do fruit harvesters, real estate brokers, bankers and CEOs have in common?
All of them are paid based on their performance. Performance-pay contracts have
become increasingly popular across the income distribution. Empirically, a large share
 roughly half  of all the jobs in the U.S. involves performance-based compensation
(Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009)) in the form of piece rates, commissions,
bonuses, and stock options. These contracts are qualitatively dierent from usual
wage contracts. Indeed, the structure of earnings is designed not only to compensate
the employee for completing the job, but also to provide incentives for eort in the
rst place. When wages are highly sensitive to performance  incentives are high-
powered  employees are generously rewarded for better outcomes, but at the same
time they are also more exposed to risk. Crucially, we expect both the level and
the performance-sensitivity of these contracts to be endogenous to the tax policy
implemented by the government. Yet despite the prevalence of these compensation
schemes, they have not been systematically studied in the taxation literature. We ll
this gap. In a general and tractable framework we derive in closed form the incidence
of tax reforms on the earnings and utility that performance-pay workers receive in
equilibrium. We also derive the impact of taxes on government revenue and social
welfare, as well as the optimal rate of tax progressivity in the presence of such realistic
labor contracts.
A widespread concern is that traditional models of income taxation in the tradi-
tion of Mirrlees (1971) substantially overstate the optimal level of taxes, by assuming
that heterogeneity in wage rates is exogenous and policy-invariant.1 Instead, when
wage risk is endogenous, increasing the progressivity of income taxes should lead to a
crowding-out of private insurance provided by rms, that is, a one-for-one spread of
the pre-tax earnings distribution. Theoretically, this crowding-out has been shown to
be of critical importance in various contexts  in particular by Attanasio and Ros-
Rull (2000), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007), and Krueger and Perri (2011)  where
it severely limits the ability of governments to provide social insurance. Empirically,
evidence of such crowding-out has been highlighted in several markets, for instance
unemployment or health insurance  see Cullen and Gruber (2000); Schoeni (2002);
1This is the case both in the static (for instance Saez (2001)) and dynamic (for instance Golosov,
Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003); Farhi and Werning (2013); Golosov, Troshkin, and Tsyvinski
(2016)) frameworks.
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Cutler and Gruber (1996a,b). Yet the empirical literature that studies the impact
of income taxes on the structure of performance-pay contracts often fails to nd sig-
nicant crowding-out eects, see for instance Rose and Wolfram (2002); Frydman
and Molloy (2011). Our paper reconciles these ndings by highlighting a counter-
vailing force that keeps earnings risk practically unaected by tax policy. This novel
performance-pay eect is driven by labor supply adjustments. Under a more pro-
gressive tax code, the worker's optimal level of eort is lower. The rm elicits this
labor supply reduction by providing more insurance (crowding-in). We nd that this
performance-pay eect almost fully osets the crowding-out.
We set up a model in which income inequality arises from two distinct sources,
namely, innate ability dierences, and ex-post performance shocks that aect the out-
put of equally talented workers. While the former source of wage disparities cannot
be insured by private markets, the latter is very much shaped in the labor market.
In the presence of moral hazard frictions, wage risk has a productive role: employers
choose the amount of risk faced by their employees through performance-based pay
contracts in order to strike a balance between insurance and incentives for eort. Our
modeling of labor markets is based on those of Edmans and Gabaix (2011) for our
static setting, and Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik, and Sannikov (2012) for our dynamic set-
ting. Their frameworks have been very successful at explaining the empirical features
of actual performance-based contracts (see Edmans and Gabaix (2016)). We extend
them to incorporate sophisticated nonlinear policy instruments. The key technical
breakthrough is that we allow for arbitrarily nonlinear tax instruments. Previous
models of moral hazard were tractable only under very restricted forms of the utility
of consumption  for instance, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) impose exponential
utility functions. This makes it impossible to consider a wide class of tax schedules
 typically, they would have to be restricted to being ane  since nonlinear taxes
eectively modify the concavity of the utility that workers receive from their salaries.
Instead, the analysis of Edmans and Gabaix (2011) remains tractable for very general
utility functions. Therefore it allows us to study the incidence of arbitrary tax reforms
(say, increasing taxes on the rich, or altering the shape of the EITC) of any initial tax
schedule (say, the U.S. tax code). Our analysis is thus very general and can be used
for both positive and normative investigation. The government has an eective role to
play despite the fact that private insurance markets are constrained ecient. Indeed,
while rms optimally provide insurance against ex-post output risk, the government
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uses tax policy for redistribution between workers with dierent ex-ante ability.
We start with a positive analysis of the incidence of tax reforms on the workers'
labor contracts and the distribution of utilities. In standard models with exogenous
wage risk, taxes aect earnings only by modifying individual labor eort decisions. In
our framework, wage risk is endogenous to policy as well. We show that it responds to
tax changes via two channels: a crowding-out eect, and a performance-pay eect. On
the one hand, the crowding-out eect is the optimal response of rms to a change in
social insurance: they adjust the earnings contract endogenously so that the workers'
incentives for eort and participation constraints remain satised after the reform.
Thus, following an improvement in social insurance (higher tax progressivity), rms
respond by spreading the pre-tax earnings schedule. The performance-pay eect, on
the other hand, arises from the optimal labor supply adjustment to the tax reform.
As in standard models of income taxation, workers' optimal eort is lower in response
to an increase in marginal tax rates or tax progressivity. But eliciting a lower eort
level in the presence of moral hazard frictions is achieved by lowering the sensitivity of
pre-tax earnings to performance, that is, by compressing the wage distribution. This
eect counteracts the direct crowding-out of private insurance that the tax reform
induces. Crucially, because our model is tractable, we are able to derive this tax
incidence analysis entirely in closed form for an arbitrary baseline tax system and
arbitrary tax reforms.
We show both theoretically and quantitatively in a calibrated version of our model
that the two earnings risk adjustments almost fully oset each other in response to
an increase in the progressivity of the tax code. Taken separately these eects are
both signicant, but summing them implies that taxes barely aect the sensitivity
of pay to compensation. Moreover, this result is robust to the value of the labor
supply elasticity. The fundamental reason is that the sensitivity of the contract to
performance is proportional to the marginal disutility of labor. As a result, in order
to elicit a given increase in labor eort, the rm must increase the pass-through of
output risk to earnings proportionally to the inverse of the labor supply elasticity.
Therefore, if labor eort is relatively inelastic, the change in performance-sensitivity
necessary to elicit the optimal eort change must be large, and vice versa. We evaluate
the robustness of this result to other canonical tax reforms and show that in all cases,
the performance-pay osets at least fty percent, and in some cases even dominates,
the direct crowding-out eect.
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Armed with this tax incidence analysis, we then derive the impact of tax reforms
on government revenue and social welfare, as well as the optimal level of tax progres-
sivity. This analysis extends Chetty and Saez (2010) to our environment with arbi-
trarily nonlinear taxes. In addition to the standard eects obtained in the benchmark
model with exogenous wage risk, the crowding-out and performance-pay eects cre-
ate scal externalities: given an initially progressive tax code, a spread (respectively,
contraction) of the pre-tax earnings distribution impacts positively (resp., negatively)
the government budget. Moreover, the crowding-out eect has a rst-order negative
impact on social welfare. This is because, following a tax reform, rms adjust wages
in a way that renders tax cuts less accurately targeted than in a model with exoge-
nous risk. This modies the relevant social welfare weights in the direction of less
redistribution. We then impose a number of functional form assumptions to make
the analysis as transparent as possible and obtain sharper results. In particular, we
assume that the nonlinear tax schedule is restricted to having a constant rate of pro-
gressivity (as in, for instance, Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017)). Within
this class of tax schedules, we derive the optimal rate of progressivity in closed form
and show that it is smaller than when wage risk is considered exogenous. However,
the welfare losses from setting taxes suboptimally by ignoring the endogeneity of wage
risk are quantitatively limited, equivalent to a mere 0.24% drop in consumption. This
is because only roughly half of the jobs in our calibration are performance-pay, which
reduces the aggregate welfare losses from ignoring the endogeneity of wage risk to a
quarter of what they would be if all jobs were subject to agency frictions. We con-
clude that the common concern that standard models overstate optimal tax policy by
ignoring the endogeneity of private insurance is  in the context of performance-pay
jobs  overblown.
Literature Review. The two papers that are closest to ours are Golosov and
Tsyvinski (2007) and Chetty and Saez (2010). Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007) study
an economy in which rms insure their workers subject to unobservable productivity
and hidden asset trades. They show that tax reforms generate a large crowding
out eect which reduces the gains from public insurance. The government optimally
refrains from providing insurance and instead uses tax policy to correct the externality
generated by hidden trades. In our environment, markets are constrained ecient.
Instead, we study how the redistributive motive for government intervention interacts
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with the endogenous private insurance on the labor market. Chetty and Saez (2010)
derive a sucient statistics formula for the optimal linear tax in the presence of
linear private insurance contracts. We extend their analysis in two ways. First, and
most importantly, rather than following an approach based purely on endogenous
sucient statistics  in particular, the elasticity of crowd-out with respect to tax
policy  we study a tractable structural microfoundation for the equilibrium labor
contracts. This allows us to characterize analytically the eects of government policy
on private insurance contracts via crowding-out and performance-pay responses, and
derive explicit theoretical formulas for tax incidence and optimal taxes. Second,
we allow for arbitrarily nonlinear taxes in the equilibrium with nonlinear incentive
contracts, and we show that several novel eects arise from theses nonlinearities.
Our paper is motivated by the large literature that studies performance-pay con-
tracts as an optimal way for rms to incentivize workers' eort in the presence of
moral hazard frictions. On the theoretical side, our baseline framework is the model
of Edmans and Gabaix (2011) for our static setting, and that of Edmans et al. (2012)
for our dynamic setting. These models have been very successful at explaining the
structure of performance-pay contracts of CEOs (Frydman and Jenter (2010); Edmans
and Gabaix (2016); Edmans, Gabaix, and Jenter (2017)). On the empirical side, there
is growing reduced-form and structural evidence that moral hazard in labor markets is
pervasive (Foster and Rosenzweig (1994); Prendergast (1999); Shearer (2004); Lazear
and Oyer (2010); Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2011); Ábrahám, Alvarez-Parra,
and Forstner (2016a)), that employers are important providers of insurance for their
employees (Guiso, Pistaferri, and Schivardi (2005); Lamadon (2016); Friedrich, Laun,
Meghir, and Pistaferri (2019); Lamadon, Mogstad, and Setzler (2019)), and that
the fraction of jobs with explicit pay-for-performance is high and rising (Lemieux,
MacLeod, and Parent (2009); Bloom and Van Reenen (2010); Bell and Van Reenen
(2014); Grigsby, Hurst, and Yildirmaz (2019)). Analogous to Kaplow (1991), our key
contribution to this large literature is to analyze the eects of policy in such envi-
ronments where the worker-rm relationship is modeled as a moral hazard problem.
Crucially, our policy instruments are very general, yet our analysis remains tractable.
Our results can help guide future empirical analysis on the impact of taxes on the
level and structure of performance-pay packages in the spirit of Rose and Wolfram
(2002); Frydman and Molloy (2011); Bird (2018); Dale-Olsen (2012).
Several other papers study optimal taxation with endogenous earnings risk. These
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papers focus on risk generated by human capital accumulation (Kapicka and Neira
(2013); Findeisen and Sachs (2016); Stantcheva (2017); Makris and Pavan (2017)),
job search (Sleet and Yazici (2017)), or wage randomization in response to exces-
sive tax regressivity (Doligalski (2019)). Blomqvist and Horn (1984); Rochet (1991);
Cremer and Pestieau (1996) studied the joint design of optimal insurance and re-
distribution but in these papers the government is the sole provider of insurance.
Another strand in the taxation literature studies government taxation in the pres-
ence of endogenous consumption insurance, understood either as informal exchanges
in family networks or asset trades. Attanasio and Ros-Rull (2000) and Krueger
and Perri (2011) demonstrate a potentially large crowding-out of private insurance
in response to increased public insurance. Park (2014); Ábrahám et al. (2016b);
Heathcote et al. (2017); Chang and Park (2017); Raj (2019), characterize the optimal
tax systems in such economies. In contrast to these papers, it is pre-tax earnings
risk  rather than consumption risk  that is endogenous to policy in our model.
Finally, several papers in the optimal taxation literature allow wages to be deter-
mined on private labor markets, for instance Hungerbühler, Lehmann, Parmentier,
and Van der Linden (2006); Rothschild and Scheuer (2013, 2016, 2014); Stantcheva
(2014); Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2014); Scheuer and Werning (2017, 2016); Ales,
Kurnaz, and Sleet (2015); Ales and Sleet (2016); Ales, Bellofatto, and Wang (2017);
Sachs, Tsyvinski, and Werquin (2020). These papers do not account for wage-rate
risk and performance-based earnings caused by moral hazard frictions.
Outline of the Paper. Our paper is organized as follows. We set up our baseline
static environment in Section 1. In Section 2, we analyze the incidence of arbitrary
nonlinear tax reforms on the structure of performance-based compensation and on
the distribution of utilities. In Section 3, we derive the excess burden and the social
welfare gains of tax reforms. We then focus on a special case of our model to derive
sharper results, as well as the optimal rate of progressivity, in Section 4. We study
our results quantitatively in Section 5. The proofs, extensions of our baseline model,




Individuals. There is a continuum of mass one of agents indexed by their exogenous
innate ability θ ∈ Θ ⊂ R+ distributed according to the c.d.f. F (θ). Their preferences
over consumption c and labor eort a ≥ 0 are represented by a separable utility
function u (c)−h (a), where u and h are twice continuously dierentiable, u is concave,
and h is strictly convex. An agent with earnings2 w pays a tax liability T (w) and
consumes c = w − T (w). The tax schedule T : R+ → R is twice continuously
dierentiable. We denote by R (w) ≡ w−T (w) the retention function and by r (w) ≡
R′ (w) = 1− T ′ (w) the retention (or net-of-tax) rate. We assume that the utility of
earnings w 7→ v (w) ≡ u (R (w)) is concave.3
Labor Contract. A worker with ability θ who provides eort a produces output
y = θ (a+ η) , (1)
where the performance shock η ∈ R is a random variable with mean 0, distributed
on a (possibly unbounded) interval with interior (η, η̄). The rm observes both the
agent's ability θ and her realized output y, but cannot disentangle her eort a from
her performance shock η. A performance-based contract species an eort level and
an earnings schedule as a function of realized output. Following Edmans and Gabaix
(2011), we impose the following assumption in order to characterize the optimal
contract analytically.
Assumption 1. The agent chooses eort after observing the realization of her per-
formance shock η. The rm recommends the same eort level a (θ) for all agents with
ability θ.
We discuss Assumption 1 in Section 1.3 below. We relax its second part and extend
our analysis to arbitrary eort schedules a (θ, η) in Appendix C. Note that the rm
2Throughout the paper we denote a worker's earnings or income by w, while the term wage-rate
stands for earnings per unit of eort w/a.
3This condition holds as long as the tax schedule T is not too regressive; see Appendix A for
details. It is a natural restriction: Doligalski (2019) shows that when this condition is violated,
rms have incentives to oer stochastic earnings even in the absence of moral hazard frictions.
Furthermore, the tax schedule which encourages such earnings randomization is Pareto inecient.
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can infer the worker's performance shock η̂ = y/θ − a (θ) upon observing her output
y, assuming that she has exerted the recommended eort level a (θ). Therefore,
the earnings contract can be equivalently expressed as a function of the inferred
performance shock η̂ rather than the realized output y. Since recommended eort is
incentive-compatible by construction, in equilibrium the rm infers the worker's true
performance shock, that is, η̂ = η. Thus, throughout the paper we simply denote the
earnings schedule by the map η 7→ w (θ, η).
The rm chooses the contract {a (θ) , w (θ, ·)} that maximizes its expected prot
given the tax schedule T and the worker's reservation utility U (θ), that is,4
Π (θ) = max
a(θ),w(θ,·)
E [y − w (θ, η)] , (2)
subject to the incentive-compatibility constraints:
a (θ) = arg max
a≥0
u (R (w (θ, η)))− h (a) , ∀η, (3)
and the participation constraint:
E [u (R (w (θ, η)))]− h (a (θ)) ≥ U (θ) . (4)
Since the participation constraint (4) binds at the optimum, the expected utility of
workers with ability θ is equal to U (θ). The incentive-compatibility constraints (3)
deserve some explanation. Since eort is chosen after the worker observes her per-
formance shock η, it must maximize utility state-by-state rather than in expectation.
Thus, equation (3) must hold for every performance shock realization η.
Labor Market Equilibrium. To close the model, we assume that there is free
entry of rms in each labor market θ.5 Thus, in equilibrium prots are equal to zero,
Π (θ) = 0. (5)
4Throughout the paper, the operator E denotes the expectation over performance shocks η, or
equivalently output y, conditional on ability θ.
5We can easily generalize our analysis to environments where rms have market power and
make positive prots. In particular, the optimal contract characterization (6, 7) holds for any
reservation value U (θ), not necessarily determined by free-entry. For instance we can assume that
the worker's reservation value is a convex combination of the reservation value under free entry and
some exogenous outside option.
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This condition pins down the workers' reservation value U (θ), which is just high
enough so that no additional rm nds it protable to enter the labor market.
1.2 Equilibrium Labor Contract
The following proposition characterizes the optimal contract between the rm and a
worker with ability θ. It is an application of the results of Edmans and Gabaix (2011)
to our environment with a nonlinear tax schedule.
Proposition 1. The optimal contract {a (θ) , w (θ, ·)} and equilibrium expected utility
U (θ) of agents with ability θ when a (θ) > 0 are characterized by the following three
equations.6 The earnings schedule w (θ, ·) satises
u (R (w (θ, η)))− h (a (θ)) = U (θ) + h′ (a (θ)) η, ∀η. (6)













The equilibrium reservation utility U (θ) is determined by
E
[
v−1 (U (θ) + h (a (θ)) + h′ (a (θ)) η)
]
= θa (θ) . (8)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Earnings Schedule. In order to motivate high-performing workers to provide as
much eort a (θ) as those with lower performance shocks, the rm needs to reward
them with higher earnings. Equation (6) shows that the agent's ex-post utility
u (R (w (θ, η))) − h (a (θ)) is an ane function of the performance shock η that the
rm infers. The linearity of the contract in the utility space is a consequence of our
assumption of a separable utility function.7 Since we assumed that the utility of earn-
6When the optimal eort level is zero, the worker optimally receives no compensation from the
rm. Our analysis goes through without assuming a (θ) > 0 if h′ (0) = 0.
7Note that the earnings schedule (6) is non-trivial even if the utility of consumption u (·) is linear:
in this case, a progressive income tax schedule implies that the utility of earnings v (w) = R (w) is
strictly concave, so that the worker is eectively averse to pre-tax earnings risk and values insurance
against performance shocks.
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ings w 7→ v (w) ≡ u (R (w)) is concave, this translates into a convex earnings schedule
w (θ, ·). Empirically, performance-pay contracts are indeed often convex, either due
to nonlinear commission rates as in the case of stock and travel brokers (Levitt and
Syverson (2008))8 or to stock options (Edmans and Gabaix (2011, 2016)).
The two key features of the utility schedule (6) are its demogrant and its slope.
Its demogrant in (6) is equal to U (θ): a higher reservation value leads the rm to
raise the utility of workers uniformly regardless of their performance so as to preserve
incentive-compatibility. Its slope is equal to h′ (a (θ)): inducing an agent with large
unobservable performance shock to provide costly work eort requires a larger reward
if the marginal disutility of labor is higher. Crucially, since the marginal disutility
h′ (·) is increasing, the sensitivity of utility to performance shocks is strictly increasing
in labor eort a (θ). This observation captures the fundamental insight that eliciting
higher eort from a worker in the presence of moral hazard requires a higher exposure
to output risk.
Eort Level. Equation (7) pins down the value of eort that maximizes the rm's
prot. The optimal level a (θ) is such that the expected gain in output θâ due to
a marginal increase â > 0 in the workers' eort is exactly compensated by the pay
raise necessary to elicit this higher eort. This cost has two components. First,
to ensure that agents' participation constraint (4) remains satised despite their
higher labor supply, their earnings must increase to compensate their utility loss
−∆h (a (θ)) = −h′ (a (θ)) â. In a frictionless economy, this would be the only eect
and (7) would reduce to the familiar optimality condition h
′(a(θ))
v′(w(θ,η))
= θ, according to
which the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between eort and earnings is equal
to the marginal rate of transformation, or labor productivity θ.
In our setting with moral hazard, agency frictions create a wedge between labor
productivity and the (expected) marginal rate of substitution, even in the absence
of any distortionary taxes.9 Providing incentives to work harder requires increasing
8While it is common for real-estate brokers to be compensated with a xed commision rate,
thus leading to a linear earnings schedule, Levitt and Syverson (2008) show that such contracts are
suboptimal and could be improved by introducing convexity.
9The term h
′′(a(θ))




v′(w(θ,η)) where ε (θ) is the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply. Thus, the wedge τMCI between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate
of transformation at performance shock realization η, dened by (1 + τMCI)
h′(a(θ))
v′(w(θ,η)) = θ, is equal
to ηε(θ)a(θ) .
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the sensitivity h′ (a (θ)) of utility to performance shocks by ∆h′ (a (θ)) = h′′ (a (θ)) â,
and hence the slope of the earnings schedule by h
′′(a(θ))â
v′(w(θ,η))
. This mechanically changes




to the second expectation in the left-hand side of (7) which we call the marginal
cost of incentives (MCI). In particular, eliciting a higher eort level requires raising
(respectively, lowering) the earnings of high- (resp., low-) performers. Yet, since
the marginal utility v′ (w) = r (w)u′ (R (w)) is decreasing the prot generated by a
smaller wage bill for unlucky workers does not fully compensate the rm for the cost
of raising the wages of lucky workers. As a result, the expected cost of providing
incentives is positive.
Expected Utility. Finally, equation (8) is simply a rewriting of the free-entry
condition (5). It implies that the average income E [w (θ, η)] of agents with ability θ
is equal to their expected output E [y] = θa (θ). Using formula (6), this equilibrium
condition pins down the workers' reservation value U (θ).
1.3 Discussion of Assumptions
To obtain the tractable characterization of the contract described in Proposition 1,
our analysis relied on several key assumptions.
Utility Function. The rst restriction is the separability of the utility function
between consumption and eort. This assumption is not essential and is only made
for clarity of exposition. As in Edmans and Gabaix (2011), it is straightforward to
extend our analysis to a larger class of utility functions, namely, φ (u (c)− h (a)) where
φ exhibits non-increasing absolute risk aversion (NIARA).10 In particular, this would
allow us to nest the functional form assumed by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). The
fact that the slope of the contract is equal to h′ (a (θ)), which is crucial for our main
results, is robust to this more general specication. The only dierence that this more
general specication would make is that the distribution of a rent by the rm would
no longer lead to a uniform shift in ex-post utilities via the demogrant U (θ). Our
arguments can however be straightforwardly extended to alternative distributions of
rents.
10Most common utility functions, in particular those with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA)
or constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), belong to the NIARA class.
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Timing. The rst part of Assumption 1 imposes that the worker chooses eort
a after observing the performance shock η. This timing assumption was originally
introduced by Laont and Tirole (1986) and was subsequently used by, for instance,
Edmans and Gabaix (2011); Garrett and Pavan (2015). It allows us to solve the
rm's problem for a very general class of utility functions. Allowing for arbitrary
utility functions is crucial for our analysis. Indeed, nonlinear taxes eectively modify
the concavity of the utility that workers derive from their gross earnings. If we had
to restrict the utility function to a specic functional form (for instance, CARA as in
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987)) we would only be able to study tax schedules that
preserve this functional form (for instance, linear or ane). Instead, the tractability
allowed by our timing assumption allows us to characterize the incidence of arbitrarily
nonlinear taxes.
Eort. In the main body of the paper, we impose that the rm chooses to elicit the
same level of eort regardless of the worker's performance shock  this is the second
part of Assumption 1. This restriction is also imposed by Edmans and Gabaix (2011)
in their main model, and by Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik, and Sannikov (2012). It is an
exogenous restriction on the set of contracts that is not without loss of generality.
It substantially simplies our analysis without restricting the shape of the earnings
schedule, which is crucial for our investigation of private insurance and nonlinear
taxation. Carroll and Meng (2016) provide a microfoundation of this restriction; they
call this property reliability and show that it may be optimal when rms aim to design
a contract that is robust to uncertainty about the distribution of the performance
shock.11 For completeness, we relax this constant-eort assumption and generalize
our main result (Theorem 1) to fully optimal contracts in Appendix C  our theoretical
analysis remains technically straightforward and carries qualitatively over to this case.
Performance Shocks. Finally, and importantly, note that we do not impose any
restriction on the distribution of performance shocks η, other than it must take values
in an interval (bounded or unbounded). We view this generality as an important
feature of our analysis. As an example, this allows us to capture the structure of
contracts that specify of a xed baseline income and an additional bonus paid with
11In particular, in our environment such a contract leads to the same level of expected output
Ey = θa (θ) regardless of the distribution of η. However, the rm's expected prot depends on the
distribution of η as earnings w (θ, η) are not linear in η.
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positive probability by letting the distribution of η have a mass point at the lower
bound η, and a smooth density on (η, η̄). Importantly, it also allows us to let the
distribution of η, and hence the degree of performance-pay, depend explicitly on the
ability level θ.
2 General Tax Incidence Analysis
This section is devoted to the positive analysis of nonlinear tax incidence. We derive
the impact of tax reforms on earnings, rst in Section 2.1 in a benchmark setting
with exogenous risk, then in Section 2.2 in our general environment that takes into
account the endogeneity of private insurance. In Section 2.3 we derive the impact
of tax reforms on individual utilities. We nally introduce the relevant notions of
earnings elasticities in Section 2.4 in order to express our tax incidence formulas in
terms of empirically estimable variables.
Nonlinear Tax Reforms. We start by formally dening the concept of nonlinear
reforms of an arbitrary initial tax system. Consider a given (potentially suboptimal)
tax schedule T , say the U.S. tax code, and another function T̂ : R+ → R. Our goal is
to evaluate the eects of perturbing the initial tax schedule T by δT̂ , where δ > 0 is a
scalar that parametrizes the size of the reform in the direction T̂ . Formally, consider
an outcome variable Ψ, for instance individual earnings, utility, government revenue,
or social welfare, that depends on the tax schedule T . The rst-order change in the
value of this functional T 7→ Ψ (T ) following a marginal tax reform in the direction
T̂ is given by the Gateaux derivative
Ψ̂(T, T̂ ) ≡ lim
δ→0
Ψ(T + δT̂ )−Ψ (T )
δ
. (9)
We analyze several concrete examples of tax reforms in Section 4 and Appendix B.
2.1 Exogenous Risk Benchmark
As a preliminary step towards our general analysis, we derive in this section the
incidence of tax reforms T̂ on earnings w (θ, η) and utilities U (θ) that would arise
in an environment with fully exogenous risk. In this benchmark model, as in our
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framework, there are two sources of heterogeneity: innate ability θ and job-specic
productivity shocks η. A worker with characteristics (θ, η) is oered a xed wage rate
x (θ, η) that reects her exogenous labor productivity. To make this model comparable
to ours we assume moreover that the worker's labor eort a (θ) is independent of η.12
A worker's income w (θ, η) is then the product of her exogenous labor productivity
x (θ, η) and her labor supply a (θ). The key dierence with our general environment
is that in this benchmark setting, wage rates w(θ,η)
a(θ)
= x (θ, η) are policy-invariant.
Incidence of Tax Reforms on Earnings. In such an environment, tax reforms
only aect earnings w (θ, η) by the endogenous change in eort â (θ) caused by the
reform, multiplied by the constant wage rate x (θ, η). Thus, the incidence of tax
reforms is given by13




This is the standard behavioral response to taxes through labor supply choices ana-
lyzed in most of the optimal taxation literature following Mirrlees (1971).14 Impor-
tantly, note that the eort change â (θ) in formula (10) depends on the particular
reform that is implemented  formally, it is the Gateaux derivative of the eort func-
tional a (θ) in the direction T̂ . Thus, at this stage â(θ)
a(θ)
is a policy elasticity in the
sense of Hendren (2015).15 Section 2.4 below is devoted to expressing this labor sup-
ply response in terms of standard elasticities and income eect parameters that can
be estimated empirically independently of a particular choice of tax reform.
Formula (10) implies that ŵex (θ, η) > 0 i â (θ) > 0. That is, the earnings
schedule is shifted up (resp., down) if eort increases (resp., decreases) following the
12This can be justied by assuming that in this model eort is chosen before observing the
realization of η.
13For notational simplicity, whenever there is no ambiguity we ignore the dependence of the
Gateaux derivative â (θ) on the initial tax schedule T and the tax reform T̂ .
14Note that we would obtain exactly the same expression in the Mirrlees model without within-
group inequality, that is, σ2η = 0. In this case, all earnings dierences are due to innate ability
(or labor productivity) θ and eort a (θ), so that the compensation schedule w (θ, ·) conditional on
ability is degenerate. Equation (10) then reduces to ŵex (θ, η) = θâ (θ).
15This is the concept of elasticity used in several papers in the taxation literature, for instance,
Chetty and Saez (2010).
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= θâ (θ) . (11)
Now, consider the impact of the reform on earnings risk around this mean adjust-
ment. We measure earnings risk by the variance of log-earnings conditional on ability
θ. Since eort a (θ) does not depend on η, equation (10) immediately implies that
earnings risk after the reform is the same as before the reform, that is,
Var [log (w (θ, η) + δŵex (θ, η)) | θ] = Var [log (w (θ, η)) | θ] (12)
for δ > 0 small enough. Therefore, in the benchmark model that ignores the endo-
geneity of private insurance, tax reforms aect the average level of earnings but do
not modify the amount of risk to which workers are exposed.16
Incidence of Tax Reforms on Welfare. Finally, in the benchmark model with
exogenous risk, the incidence of the tax reform on the average utility of agents with
ability θ is given by
Û (θ) = −E
[
u′ (R (w (θ, η))) T̂ (w (θ, η))
]
. (13)
Intuitively, an increase in the tax payment of an agent by T̂ (w (θ, η)) lowers her
ex-post utility by the marginal utility of consumption u′ (R (w (θ, η))). This is a
simple consequence of the envelope theorem: since labor eort is chosen optimally
by equation (3), the endogenous change in eort â (θ) triggered by the reform has no
rst-order impact on welfare.17 Taking expectations leads to the change in expected
utility (13).
16We can also dene earnings risk at a disaggregated level by the pass-through function ∂ logw(θ,η)∂η ,
that is, the sensitivity of log-earnings to performance shocks. Equation (10) implies that the pass-
through is unaected by the reform for every value of η. If we dene instead earnings risk as the
sensitivity of earnings (rather than log-earnings) with respect to performance shocks, that is, ∂w(θ,η)∂η ,
tax reforms would raise earnings risk if and only if ∂ŵ(θ,η)∂η > 0. In the setting analyzed in this section,
formula (10) implies that this is the case whenever the reform raises eort, that is, â (θ) > 0.
17In particular, in this environment a change in marginal tax rates that keeps the total tax
payment unchanged has no rst-order impact on individual welfare.
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2.2 Incidence of Tax Reforms on Earnings
We now proceed to characterizing the incidence of an arbitrary tax reform T̂ on the
compensation schedule w (θ, ·) of workers with ability θ in our general environment.
This is the rst main result of our paper.
Theorem 1. Suppose that a (θ) > 0. Denote by â (θ) the change in eort induced
by the reform, which we study in Section 2.4 below. The rst-order eect of the tax
reform T̂ on earnings w (θ, ·) is given by
ŵ (θ, η) = ŵex (θ, η) + ŵco (θ, η) + ŵpp (θ, η) , (14)
where the crowding-out eect ŵco has mean zero and is given by
ŵco (θ, η) =
T̂ (w (θ, η))
r (w (θ, η))
− (v
′ (w (θ, η)))−1
E
[
(v′ (w (θ, ·)))−1
] E[ T̂ (w (θ, ·))
r (w (θ, ·))
]
, (15)
and the performance-pay eect ŵpp has mean zero and is given by
ŵpp (θ, η) =
[
h′ (a (θ)) + h′′ (a (θ)) η
v′ (w (θ, η))
− w (θ, η)
a (θ)
]
â (θ) . (16)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Equation (14) gives the adjustment of the earnings schedule following an arbitrary
tax reform T̂ as a function of the tax rates, earnings distribution, and labor supply
responses in the initial (pre-reform) economy. In practice, this formula only requires
choosing a functional form for the utility function u and the disutility of eort h in
order to evaluate the incidence of any potential reform of the current tax code.
Theorem 1 shows that the earnings adjustment in response to the tax reform,
ŵ (θ, η), is in general dierent than in the standard model with exogenous risk,
ŵex (θ, η), analyzed in Section 2.1. Specically, the tax reform modies the earn-
ings schedule by the same average amount as in the benchmark model (see equation
(11)), since E[ŵco (θ, η)] = E[ŵpp (θ, η)] = 0. However, it also introduces two ad-
justments to earnings risk around this mean shift. The rst, ŵco (θ, η), captures the
crowding-out of the private insurance contract by the tax change, keeping eort con-
stant. The second, ŵpp (θ, η), is the performance-pay eect due to the endogenous
change in labor eort. We analyze them in turn.
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Crowding-Out of Private Insurance. Equation (15) gives the adjustment to the
compensation schedule that the rm must implement in order to keep the worker's
incentive and participation constraints both satised following the reform. First,
consider the adjustment T̂ (w(θ,η))
r(w(θ,η))
of the earnings schedule (rst term in (15)). This
term implies that the agent's consumption c (θ, η) = w (θ, η)−T (w (θ, η)) changes by
ĉ (θ, η) = −T̂ (w (θ, η)) + (1− T ′ (w (θ, η))) ŵ (θ, η)
= −T̂ (w (θ, η)) + (1− T ′ (w (θ, η))) T̂ (w (θ, η))
1− T ′ (w (θ, η))
= 0.
Thus, absent any other forces  in particular, if eort were kept constant  the rm
would adjust the contract such that, for every performance shock realization η, the
agent's disposable income c (θ, η), and hence her realized utility, remain xed. In
other words, any attempt by the government to aect consumption insurance would
be fully absorbed by the rm so as to keep the worker's payos unchanged.
Second, suppose that the tax reform is such that the tax liabilities of workers
with ability θ are reduced, that is, T̂ (w (θ, η)) < 0 for all η. Per our discussion in the
previous paragraph, this reform generates a rent for the rm equal to −E[ T̂ (w(θ,·))
r(w(θ,·)) ] > 0:
intuitively, the rm compensates the reduction in tax payments by an equivalent
reduction in wages. Now, by the free-entry condition, this rent must be shared with
workers, whose expected utility rises as a result.18 Recall that, by equation (6), this
increase in utility must be distributed uniformly among all agents  regardless of their
performance η  in order to preserve their incentive compatibility condition for eort.
But this implies that the salary of high-performers must increase by a larger amount,
since their marginal utility of earnings v′ (w (θ, η)) is lower. As a result, the share of
the rent assigned to workers with performance shock η is inversely proportional to
their marginal utility, that is, equal to (v
′(w(θ,η)))−1
E[(v′(w(θ,·)))−1] . This leads to the second term
in (15).
Performance-Pay Eect. Now, suppose that in response to the tax reform T̂ ,
the rm nds it optimal to elicit a higher eort level, so that â (θ) > 0. In order
to do so, we showed in Section 1.2 that it must both compensate workers for their
utility loss, and increase the pass-through of performance shocks to earnings. These
two adjustments are captured by the term h
′(a(θ))+h′′(a(θ))η
v′(w(θ,η))
in equation (16). Since




â (θ) is an increasing function of η, eliciting a higher eort level re-
quires increasing the sensitivity of earnings to performance. Now, ŵpp is dened by
subtracting the income change ŵex (θ, η) that would arise in the benchmark model
with exogenous risk in response to the same change in eort (equation (10)). As a
result, the performance-pay eect has mean zero and is the pure contribution of moral
hazard to the change in earnings risk via labor supply decisions.
Generalization to an Eort Schedule. In Appendix C we extend this result to
the environment where the rm can elicit an arbitrary (non-constant) eort schedule
a (θ, η). We show that the crowding-out eect is identical to (15). The performance-
pay eect is analogous to (16) except that it depends on the change in the entire
eort schedule rather than in the single eort level.
2.3 Incidence of Tax Reforms on Utilities
We now proceed to analyzing the incidence of tax reforms on the expected utility
U (θ) of workers with ability θ in our general environment.
Proposition 2. The rst-order eect of the tax reform T̂ on expected utility Û (θ) is
given by





]E[ T̂ (w (θ, η))
r (w (θ, η))
]
. (17)
Proof. See Appendix B.
To understand Proposition 2, recall that a decrease in the tax payment of an
agent by T̂ (w (θ, η)) < 0 allows the rm to decrease her earnings by T̂ (w(θ,η))
r(w(θ,η))
in
order to keep her consumption (and, hence, incentives) unchanged. Moreover, by
the envelope theorem, any change in pay that operates via labor supply (ŵex, ŵpp)
generates only second-order changes in total labor costs. Therefore, the tax reform
creates an expected rent for the rm equal to −E[ T̂ (w(θ,η))
r(w(θ,η))
] > 0, which is then shared
with the workers and leads to an increase in their reservation value by Û (θ) > 0.
Now, this increase in expected utility Û (θ) > 0 must be distributed across work-
ers with dierent performance shocks η. As explained in the previous sections, every
worker's utility must increase uniformly. Therefore, realized earnings w (θ, η) must
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increase in proportion to the inverse marginal utility 1/v′ (w (θ, η)). Hence, this shar-
ing rule costs the rm E[ Û(θ)
v′(w(θ,η))
]. As a result, the value of Û (θ) which ensures that
prots remain equal to zero (free-entry condition) satises:
E
[
T̂ (w (θ, η))





v′ (w (θ, η))
]
= 0.
Solving for Û (θ) easily leads to equation (14).
Analogous to the standard model where tax changes aect individual consump-
tion directly rather than being intermediated by rms, equation (17) implies that
workers' expected utility increases when their expected tax payments (weighted by
retention rates) are reduced. Conversely, an increase in their expected tax bill lowers
their utility. However, the level of change in utility Û (θ) diers from that obtained in
the benchmark model with exogenous risk (equation (13)) unless σ2η = 0. As a simple
example, suppose that the initial tax schedule is ane, so that the retention rate
r (w (θ, η)) is constant. Consider a tax reform that consists of a uniform lump-sum
transfer for all agents. We show in the Appendix that this reform is represented by
T̂ (w) = −1 for all w. In the benchmark model with exogenous risk, equation (13)
shows that individual welfare would increase on average by the expected marginal
utility, E [u′ (R (w (θ, η)))]. Now, in the general model with agency frictions, applying
Jensen's inequality to equation (17) yields 0 < Û (θ) < E [u′ (R (w (θ, η)))]. There-
fore, a lump-sum transfer leads to a strictly smaller rise in utility when tax cuts are
distributed by rms than when they are directly targeted to workers.
2.4 Elasticities of Average Earnings
The last step of our tax incidence analysis is to characterize the impact of a tax
reform T̂ on the optimal eort level a (θ). We tackle this in two (complementary)
ways. First, we use a structural approach and derive analytically the impact of tax
reforms on labor eort in terms of primitives. Second, we express these labor supply
responses in terms of sucient statistics that can be estimated empirically regardless
of the values of the underlying primitives.
Structural Approach. When the structure of the model is simple enough, it is
worthwhile to derive explicitly the elasticity of eort with respect to the particular
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tax reform under consideration, that is, â(θ)
a(θ)
. This allows us to compare the incidence
of taxes across dierent contractual environments. The next result and Lemma 2
below illustrate this approach through the lens of simple examples.
Lemma 1. Suppose that the utility function is linear in consumption, that is u (c) = c,
and that earnings w (θ, η) are located in a bracket with constant marginal tax rate τ
for all performance shocks η. The response of labor eort to an arbitrary tax reform


















where ε (θ) ≡ h
′(a(θ))
a(θ)h′′(a(θ))
is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Equation (18) shows that the response of labor eort to the tax reform T̂ is
the sum of two terms, which reect both elements (MRS and MCI) of the rst-order
condition (7). First, the marginal rate of substitution (rst expectation in (7)) implies
that the change in expected marginal tax rates, E[T̂ ′ (w (θ, η))], reduces labor supply
by the Frisch elasticity ε (θ). This is the standard response one would obtain in
models with exogenous risk. Second, recall that in our moral hazard environment
the optimal eort level a (θ) is also determined by the marginal cost of incentives
(second expectation in (7)). But the MCI is positively related to the progressivity of
the tax schedule: with quasilinear utility we have MCI ∝ Cov( 1
r(w(θ,η))
; η), which is
equal to zero (respectively, positive) when the marginal tax rates are constant (resp.,
increasing with income). Consequently, starting from an ane tax code, we expect a
progressive tax reform  for which the marginal tax rate adjustments T̂ ′ (·) increase
with income  to raise the cost of incentive provision, and hence trigger an additional
downward adjustment in eort. Formally, this is indeed implied by the negative
covariance term in equation (18). Therefore, taking into account the endogeneity of
private insurance against output risk magnies the negative impact of raising tax
progressivity on labor eort. In Section 4, we generalize this result to the case of a
utility function with income eects and a nonlinear baseline tax schedule and show
that the same insight carries over.
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Sucient-Statistic Approach. In our most general environment, the analytical
expressions for the policy elasticities â(θ)
a(θ)
are technically straightforward to derive, but
they may fail to deliver sharp comparative statics with respect to the variance of per-
formance shocks σ2η or the strength of moral hazard frictions. Instead, it is standard
since Saez (2001) to express these labor supply responses in terms of substitution
and income eects that can be estimated in the data, and treat the resulting elas-
ticities as sucient statistics in our tax incidence analysis (Chetty (2009)). Namely,
our tax formulas depend on the empirical values of these parameters, regardless of
the underlying structure of the model that generates them  that is, in our case,
regardless of whether private insurance against performance shocks is exogenous or
endogenous. Our goal is therefore to express the labor supply response â(θ)
a(θ)
to any po-
tential tax reform T̂ in terms of standard elasticity parameters that can be estimated
independently of the particular reform.
To do so, recall that, by the free-entry condition (5), average earnings conditional
on ability θ, E [w (θ, ·)], are equal to θa (θ). As a consequence, the elasticities of
eort a (θ) with respect to tax changes are equal to the corresponding elasticities of
average earnings E [w (θ, ·)]. Note that to evaluate average earnings E [w (θ, ·)] the
econometrician does not need to observe the actual value of ability θ  it is enough
to group workers into ordinal ability groups proxied by education, experience, etc.
We can thus dene the (compensated) elasticity of average earnings of agents with
ability θ with respect to the retention rate at income level w (θ, η) by
εEw,r (θ, η) ≡
r (w (θ, η))
E [w (θ, ·)]
∂E [w (θ, ·)]
∂r (w (θ, η))
. (19)
We also dene the income eect parameter as the semi-elasticity of average earnings
of agents with ability θ with respect to a lump-sum transfer at income level w (θ, η),
that is,
εEw,R (θ, η) ≡
1
E [w (θ, ·)]
∂E [w (θ, ·)]




These elasticities can be estimated empirically, and their explicit analytical expres-
sions in terms of primitives are given in Appendix B.
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where εEw,r (θ, η) and εEw,R (θ, η) are dened in (19) and (20), respectively.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The interpretation of Lemma 3 is standard. An increase in the marginal tax rate by
T̂ ′ (w (θ, η)) (resp., an increase in the average tax rate by T̂ (w(θ,η))
w(θ,η)
) at the income level
w (θ, η) aects the optimal eort level a (θ) in proportion to the compensated elasticity
εEw,r (θ, η) (resp., the income eect parameter εEw,R (θ, η)). The intuition underlying
these substitution and income eects is the same as in the standard model of nonlinear
income taxation. Namely, an increase in marginal tax rates (respectively, in lump-sum
liabilities) lowers (resp., raises) the worker's optimal eort level by creating a wedge
between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation
in the optimality condition (7). The only dierence is that in our framework, it is
the rm rather than the worker that chooses how much eort should optimally be
provided, and it achieves this by spreading or compressing the earnings schedule.
Nevertheless, standard methods of estimating taxable income elasticities would give
the correct values for the parameters (19) and (20).
3 Aggregate Eects of Tax Reforms
In this section, we use our tax incidence results of Section 2 to characterize the
aggregate costs and benets of tax reforms. We introduce the government and dene
formally the concepts of excess burden and welfare gains of policies in Section 3.1.
We derive the theoretical results in Section 3.2. Readers primarily interested in the
incidence of tax reforms on individual performance-pay contracts can skip to Section
4.
3.1 Government
In our model, the government observes both between- and within-group inequality,
that is, earnings dierences due to ex-ante ability θ (proxied by education, experience,
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etc.) and ex-post job-specic shocks η. However, taxes and transfers can only be
conditioned on realized earnings w and not on ability θ. The labor income tax schedule
is function T ∈ C2(R+,R).
Government Revenue and Social Welfare. Given the tax schedule T , govern-
ment revenue is given by
R (T ) =
ˆ
Θ
E [T (w (θ, η))] dF (θ) . (22)
Throughout the paper, we assume that the government faces an exogenous expen-
diture requirement G ≥ 0. Any extra revenue is used for redistribution between
workers with dierent (uninsurable) levels of ability θ. Social welfare is evaluated by
a weighted-utilitarian functional
W (T ) =
ˆ
Θ
α (θ)U (θ) dF (θ) , (23)
where the map of Pareto weights θ 7→ α (θ) is positive, decreasing, and satises´
Θ
α (θ) dF (θ) = 1.
Mechanical Eect of Tax Reforms. Consider a tax reform T̂ of the initial tax
schedule T . The mechanical, or statutory, eect of this reform is equal to its impact
on government revenue assuming that everyone's earnings remain xed. It is given
by
ME(T, T̂ ) =
ˆ
Θ
E[T̂ (w (θ, η))]dF (θ) . (24)
That is, in the absence of endogenous earnings responses, government revenue would
simply change by the sum of (positive or negative) additional tax payments T̂ (w (θ, η))
of all agents.
Excess Burden of Tax Reforms. The excess burden, or deadweight loss, of a
tax reform T̂ is (minus) the change in government revenue caused by the endoge-
nous earnings adjustments. Since the government retains a share T ′ (w (θ, η)) of the
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workers' earnings gains or losses ŵ (θ, η), the excess burden is given by
EB(T, T̂ ) = −
ˆ
Θ
E[T ′ (w (θ, η)) ŵ (θ, η)]dF (θ) , (25)
where ŵ (θ, η) is given by (14). For instance, if a tax reform mechanically raises $1 of
revenue absent earnings adjustments, but causes distortions  say, reductions in labor
supply  which lower government revenue by ¢20, then the marginal excess burden is
equal to a fraction 20% of the mechanical eect. The total impact of the tax reform
on government budget (that is, the Gateaux derivative of the tax revenue functional
R (T )) is therefore equal to R̂(T, T̂ ) = ME(T, T̂ )− EB(T, T̂ ).
Welfare Gains of Tax Reforms. The welfare gains of a tax reform T̂ is the change
in social welfare W (T ) that it causes, expressed in monetary units. The change in
social welfare is equal to Ŵ(T, T̂ ) =
´
α (θ) Û (θ) dF (θ), where Û (θ) is the change in
expected utility incurred by agents with ability θ and α (θ) measures their weight in
the social objective. To convert this welfare measure into units of revenue, consider
another, benchmark reform T̂ ∗ within the available set of tax instruments, that costs
one dollar of revenue.19 Let the marginal value of public funds λ be the increase in
social welfare brought about by this reform T̂ ∗. We then dene the welfare gain of
the tax reform T̂ by





α (θ) Û (θ) dF (θ) . (26)
Optimum Tax Schedule. The optimal tax schedule is such that no tax reform of
the initial tax schedule that keeps the government budget constraint satised has a
positive rst-order impact on social welfare. We show in Appendix D that the optimal
tax schedule (respectively, the optimum within a restricted class of tax instruments)
19If universal lump-sum taxes and transfers are available, as in Mirrlees (1971), we naturally
choose T̂ ∗ to be a uniform lump-sum transfer. We show in Appendix B that a lump-sum transfer
of $1 per worker is represented by the constant function −1 for all w. Denote by R̂(T,−1) < 0 the
loss in government revenue from this transfer, once all behavioral responses have been taken into
account. Then the reform T̂ ∗ (w) = −1/
∣∣∣R̂(T,−1)∣∣∣ for all w is a uniform lump-sum transfer that
reduces government budget by $1 by construction. If instead the policy is restricted to the CRP
tax schedules as in Section 4, the benchmark reform T̂ ∗ consists of a decrease in the parameter τ ,
normalized analogously to yield $1 of revenue. See Appendix D for details.
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is characterized by
EB(T, T̂ ) = ME(T, T̂ ) + WG(T, T̂ ), (27)
for all tax reforms T̂ (resp., all tax reforms in the restricted class). In other words,
the marginal cost and marginal benet of any reform must be equal at the optimum.
3.2 Excess Burden and Welfare Gains
Substituting expression (14) for ŵ (θ, η) into equation (25) yields the following char-
acterization. This is the second main result of our paper.
Theorem 2. The excess burden of the tax reform T̂ is given by
EB(T, T̂ ) = −
ˆ
Θ






Cov (T ′ (w (θ, η)) , ŵi (θ, η)) dF (θ)
The welfare gains of the tax reform T̂ are given by






α̃ (θ; η)u′ (R (w (θ, η))) T̂ (w (θ, η))
]
dF (θ) , (29)
where the modied social welfare weights are given by α̃ (θ; η) ≡ (v
′(w(θ,η)))−1
E[(v′(w(θ,·)))−1]α (θ).
Proof. See Appendix D.
Formulas (28) and (29) can be used in practice to evaluate whether a concrete tax
reform proposal has a positive or negative eect on government revenue and social
welfare, starting from any (not necessarily optimal) tax code.
Excess Burden of Tax Reforms. The rst integral in (28) is equal to the dead-
weight loss one would obtain in standard models with exogenous risk  recall that
in this case, the tax reform aects earnings via the standard labor supply channel
by ŵex (θ, η) = w (θ, η)
â(θ)
a(θ)
. This deadweight loss depends on the average earnings
elasticities summarized in â(θ)
a(θ)
, as described in Lemma 3. This integral is analogous
to those typically derived in the optimal taxation literature (see for instance Saez
(2001)).
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Now consider the case where the endogeneity of private insurance is taken into
account. Recall that the full adjustment to earnings ŵ (θ, η) has the same mean as in
the frictionless benchmark. Thus, any scal externalities due to moral hazard must
come from the change in earnings risk due to the crowding-out and the performance-
pay eects ŵco (θ, η), ŵpp (θ, η). The rst implication of Corollary 2 is that if the
marginal tax rates T ′ (w (θ, η)) are initially constant  as in Chetty and Saez (2010)
 both covariances in the second line of equation (28) are equal to zero. Therefore,
the excess burden of the tax reform is the same as in the standard model, despite
the presence of moral hazard frictions and endogenous risk. In other words, the
performance-based nature of contracts and the endogenous crowding-out of private
insurance do not give rise to additional scal externalities when the tax code T is
initially ane, even if the tax reform T̂ itself is highly nonlinear.20
Consider nally the case where the tax schedule T is initially nonlinear. In this
case, the covariances in (28) are no longer equal to zero and capture the impact on
government budget of the novel sources of earnings risk highlighted in formula (14).
Suppose for concreteness that the tax schedule is initially progressive, that is, the
marginal tax rates T ′ (·) are increasing. In this case, Cov (T ′ (w (θ, η)) , ŵi (θ, η)) > 0
whenever ∂ŵi(θ,η)
∂η
> 0, that is, whenever the sensitivity of pre-tax earnings to perfor-
mance shocks increases following the reform. Therefore, a spread (resp., contraction)
of the earnings distribution causes a positive (resp., negative) scal externality, that
is, a rst-order gain (resp., loss) in government revenue. This is a consequence of
Jensen's inequality: a progressive (concave) tax code generates more tax revenue for
the government if earnings are more volatile, keeping their mean constant. For budget
purposes, the government is therefore tempted to induce an increase in the dispersion
of pre-tax earnings.
Welfare Gains of Tax Reforms. In the benchmark model with exogenous risk,
the increase in social welfare achieved by giving one additional unit of consumption
(say, via a tax break) to agents with ability θ and performance shock η is given
by the marginal social welfare weight α (θ)u′ (R (w (θ, η))), equal to their marginal
20In particular, consider the highest-income earners for whom performance-pay contracts are
particularly prevalent, and suppose that their baseline income absent any bonus  that is, their
earnings given the lowest realization η of the performance shock  is located in the highest tax
bracket. Then the performance-sensitivity of their salary is irrelevant for their contribution to
government revenue.
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utility of consumption times their weight α (θ) in the social objective. Now, in the
environment with moral hazard frictions, the crowding-out of private insurance by
tax policy highlighted in Theorem 1 has welfare consequences that must be taken
into account.21
Indeed, we saw in Section 2.2 that the tax break raises the expected utility of
the workers (Proposition 2), as in a standard model with exogenous risk. Crucially,
however, recall that this utility gain must be shared uniformly across agents in order
to preserve their eort incentives. But since the marginal utility is decreasing, this
implies that workers with a higher output realization y end up getting a higher increase
in consumption. As a result, expression (29) implies that the marginal social welfare
weights that would arise in the benchmark model are now weighted by the share
(v′(w(θ,η)))−1
E[(v′(w(θ,·)))−1]
of the tax cut that workers actually receive. These weights are regressive
 richer agents end up with higher eective welfare weights in the social objective.
Intuitively, tax cuts accrue mostly to the highest-performing agents of a given ability
group. They are thus less eciently targeted than in the standard model without rm
intermediation, in which the government could directly alter workers' consumption.
This regressive distribution of rents in turn reduces the welfare benets of providing
social insurance compared to the exogenous-risk environment.
4 The Loglinear Framework
In this section we introduce a special case of our general model that allows us to
derive sharp consequences of our results of Sections 2 and 3. In particular, under the
following functional form restrictions the equilibrium labor contract is loglinear and
our tax incidence formulas become particularly transparent.
Assumption 2. The utility of consumption is logarithmic, u (c) = log c. The Frisch









. The tax schedule has a
constant rate of progressivity (CRP),22 that is, there exist τ ∈ R and p < 1 such that
21Because of the envelope theorem, the performance-pay eect (equation (16)) induces only
second-order welfare gains or losses. The rst part of crowding-out (rst term in equation (15))
also keeps welfare constant since it ensures that workers' consumption remains xed.
22The CRP tax code is a good approximation of the U.S. tax system, see for instance Heathcote,
Storesletten, and Violante (2017). The rate of progressivity p is equal to (minus) the elasticity of
the retention rate 1− T ′ (w) with respect to income w. Alternatively, 1− p is equal to the ratio of
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T (w) = w − 1−τ
1−pw
1−p.
We characterize the equilibrium labor contract in Section 4.1. We then focus on a
particular tax reform, namely, an increase in the (constant) rate of progressivity of the
initial tax schedule. We derive the incidence of this reform on earnings and utilities
in Section 4.2, and its excess burden and welfare gains in Section 4.3. We conclude
in Section 4.4 by characterizing the optimal rate of progressivity in this economy. In
Appendix G and H, we generalize our analysis of the optimal rate of progressivity to
the dynamic environment of Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik, and Sannikov (2012).
4.1 Equilibrium Labor Contract
Under these assumptions, the labor contract characterized in Proposition 1 can be
simplied as follows.
Corollary 1. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. Denote by ψ ≡ ∂ logw(θ,η)
∂η
the pass-
through of performance shocks to log-earnings. The earnings schedule is log-linear and
given by
logw (θ, η) = log (θa) + ψ η − 1
2












where εψ,a ≡ ∂ logψ∂ log a =
1
ε
. Expected utility is given by
U (θ) = log (R (θa))− h (a)− 1
2
(1− p)ψ2σ2η. (32)
Proof. See Appendix E.
In the standard Mirrlees (1971) model, the worker's wage rate is equal to her
marginal productivity θ, and her earnings are θa. In our more general model, equation
(30) implies that the rm designs an incentive-based compensation contract that has
mean θa, but is also dispersed around this mean. The amount of risk to which the
marginal retained income 1− T ′ (w) to average retained income 1− T (w) /w.
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rm exposes the worker is summarized by the constant (that is, independent of η)
pass-through ψ of performance shocks to log-earnings.




1−p is endogenous to policy: it depends
on the rate of progressivity p of the tax schedule both directly and indirectly through




, and εψ,1−p =
∂ logψ
∂ log (1− p)
(33)
were both equal to zero, the model would be equivalent to one with an exogenous
and uninsurable shock η analogous to θ.
In general, however, the elasticity εψ,a is positive and measures the strength of
the moral hazard friction: it determines how much more exposure to performance
shocks is necessary to elicit a higher level of eort from the agent. Since εψ,a = 1ε , our
model implies that the sensitivity of earnings risk to the desired eort level is inversely
proportional to the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. If in response to a tax reform the
rm wants to reduce the eort provided by the worker, it implements it by reducing
her exposure to risk, that is, by providing more insurance against performance shocks.
In the sequel we refer to εψ,a as the performance-pay elasticity.
Second, the elasticity εψ,1−p = −1 < 0 implies that higher tax progressivity leads
to a steeper pre-tax earnings schedule. This means that ceteris paribus (that is, keep-
ing eort constant), public insurance crowds out private insurance against output risk.
Intuitively, this is because an increase in tax progressivity compresses the disposable
income distribution and thus reduces the amount of risk that workers are eectively
facing; as a response, the rm spreads out the pre-tax earnings schedule in order to
preserve incentives for eort. In the sequel we refer to εψ,1−p as the crowding-out
elasticity.
Finally, equations (31) and (32) imply that the worker's eort and expected utility
are both strictly lower in the environment with moral hazard and endogenous private
insurance, where εψ,a > 0 and εψ,1−p < 0, than in the exogenous-risk model where
εψ,a = εψ,1−p = 0. Eort is a decreasing function of the rate of tax progressivity p.
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4.2 Tax Incidence Analysis
Throughout this section we consider a tax reform that marginally raises the rate of








w1−p, ∀w > 0. (34)
To derive the incidence of this tax reform, we can either directly dierentiate with
respect to p the equilibrium labor contract given by Corollary 1, or apply Theorem 1
to the corresponding function (34). We rst derive the impact of this tax reform on
labor eort before analyzing its eect on earnings and utility.
Lemma 2. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. The elasticity of eort with respect to
progressivity εa,1−p =
∂ log a














denotes the performance-pay elasticity (33). Thus, the labor supply
elasticity εa,1−p is strictly larger in the presence of moral hazard (εψ,a > 0) than in
the benchmark model with exogenous risk (εψ,a = 0).
Proof. See Appendix E.
Equation (35) gives an analytical expression for the labor supply elasticity that




elasticity is strictly larger in an economy with moral hazard and endogenous private
insurance than in the benchmark setting with exogenous risk. Specically, in the
polar case where εψ,a = 0, we obtain εa,1−p = ε1+ε , which is an increasing function of
the Frisch elasticity ε. Instead, when the exposure to risk varies endogenously with
eort so that εψ,a > 0, we have εa,1−p > ε1+ε . The intuition underlying this result
is analogous to the case of the utility without income eects analyzed in Lemma 1.
Recall that the marginal cost of eliciting higher eort is equal to the expected marginal
rate of substitution (MRS, rst term in (7)) plus, in the presence of moral hazard,
the expected marginal cost of incentive provision (MCI, second term in (7)). But the




1−p if the utility is logarithmic and the tax schedule is CRP. Note
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that the greater the Frisch elasticity, the more the standard model underestimates
the true distortionary cost of raising tax progressivity.
Corollary 2. The impact of an increase in progressivity on earnings is given by






























and εψ,1−p = −1 denote the pass-through elasticities (33). Overall,
pre-tax earnings are strictly more exposed to output risk after the reform.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Equations (36) to (38) give closed-form expressions for the three sources of earn-
ings adjustments caused by the tax reform: the standard labor supply eect, the
crowding-out eect, and the performance-pay eect. The rst, ŵex (θ, η), is straight-
forward: it simply states that if wage rates are exogenous, the percentage earnings
response to the reform, ŵex(θ,η)
w(θ,η)




1−pεa,1−p. Taking into account the endogeneity of private insurance yields the other
two eects, ŵco (θ, η) and ŵpp (θ, η). As explained in Section 4.1 above, the crowding-
out eect strictly raises the amount of risk to which workers are exposed, measured
by the pass-through of performance shocks to log-earnings, via the crowding-out elas-
ticity εψ,1−p < 0. This pre-tax earnings adjustment ensures that their incentives are
preserved. On the other hand, the reform lowers the optimal eort that rms would
23The proof in the Appendix provides the decomposition of ŵco (θ, η) into its two eects high-
lighted in equation (15).
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like workers to exert by εa,1−p > 0. This reduction in eort is elicited by improv-
ing the worker's insurance against output shocks. Thus, the performance-pay eect
strictly reduces exposure to risk via the performance-pay elasticity εψ,a > 0. This
indirect increase in private insurance counteracts the direct crowding-out response to
the policy change.
Overall, using the structural expression (35) for the labor supply elasticity εa,1−p,
we can easily show that
εψ,1−p + εψ,a εa,1−p < 0. (39)
As a consequence, we obtain that the total earnings adjustment due to moral hazard
frictions, ŵco (θ, η) + ŵpp (θ, η), unambiguously leads to an increase in the sensitiv-
ity of pre-tax log-earnings to performance shocks. That is, the crowding-out eect
outweighs the performance-pay eect and private insurance is reduced on net.
The Crowding-Out and Performance-Pay Eects Almost Oset Each Other.
We now study the relative magnitude of the crowding-out and the performance-pay
eects. Our conclusion is that, while each of them taken separately has a large impact
on the structure of compensation, on net they almost fully oset each other so that
the earnings schedule is only barely riskier following an increase in tax progressivity.
Recall that the crowding-out elasticity εψ,1−p is equal to 1 in absolute value: this
is equivalent to saying that keeping eort constant, the variance of log-consumption
remains constant after the tax reform and the endogenous earnings adjustment. The
performance-pay eect, on the other hand, is driven by the optimal change in eort
given by the labor supply elasticity εa,1−p. The rm implements this change in eort
by adjusting the sensitivity of the contract via the pass-through elasticity εψ,a. Why
does this performance-pay eect εψ,aεa,1−p have the same order of magnitude as the
direct crowding-out adjustment εψ,1−p?
The key insight is that the performance-pay elasticity εψ,a is proportional to the
inverse of the (Frisch) elasticity of labor supply ε. This is an immediate consequence
of our key result that the slope of the contract (6) (or (30) in the loglinear model) is
equal to the marginal disutility of labor h′ (a (θ)). Thus, to raise the worker's eort by








where ε (θ) is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
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As a result, to the extent that the labor supply elasticity εa,1−p has a similar order
of magnitude as the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ε, the performance-pay eect is
approximately equal to 1
ε
× εa,1−p ≈ 1, that is, about the same as the crowding-out
eect. Crucially, this result is robust to the value of the labor supply elasticity. Indeed,
if the labor supply elasticity is small, so that eort moves only a little in response to
a tax change, then the pass-through must mechanically increase by a large amount
in order to elicit this change in eort, so that the product of the two elasticities is
always approximately equal to 1. Intuitively, if labor supply is very inelastic, eort
will barely change in response to tax reforms; but precisely because of this inelastic
behavior, a very large change in performance-sensitivity will then be necessary to
convince workers to adjust their eort by this small amount.
The previous discussion is correct if the labor supply elasticity εa,1−p (or, more
generally, â
a
in our general model) is indeed approximately equal to the Frisch elasticity
ε. In practice, this need not be exactly the case. Formula (35) gives the structural
expression for εa,1−p as a function of ε and the variance of performance shocks σ2η. We
showed that the endogeneity of private insurance raises the labor supply elasticity
with respect to an increase in tax progressivity, relative to the benchmark setting
with exogenous risk. Therefore, we know that εa,1−p must be at least as large as its
value in this environment, namely, ε
1+ε










For a Frisch elasticity ε ≈ 1
2





of the crowding-out eect εψ,1−p = −1. To rene this estimate, we use
the structural expression for the labor supply elasticity εa,1−p derived in Lemma 2. A
Taylor approximation in ψ2σ2η yields










Our calibration in Section 5.4 implies that the variance of earnings conditional on





0.1, so that the earnings adjustment due to crowding-out amounts to about 110%
(in absolute value) of the adjustment caused by the performance-pay eect. In other
24This value is lower than the Frisch elasticity ε because of the income eects on labor supply.
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words, the labor supply responses oset about 90% of the crowding-out of private
insurance by tax progressivity.
Discussion. The analysis of our quantitative model in Section 5 conrms that the
crowding out eect (15) and the performance-pay eect (16) are both signicant but
oset each other almost entirely, so that the overall eect of tax progressivity on earn-
ings risk is small. In Section 5.6 and Appendix B, we analyze both theoretically and
numerically the incidence of several other tax reforms: lump-sum tax and marginal
tax rate increases on high incomes, and a constant percentage increase in retention
rates. For each of these reforms, as in the case of an increase in tax progressivity,
the performance-pay eect counteracts, and sometimes even dominates, the direct
crowding-out of the private insurance contract. Intuitively, raising marginal tax rates
leads to a spread of the pre-tax earnings distribution, but the reduction in labor sup-
ply that it causes tends to contract it. Conversely, raising lump-sum tax payments
leads to a crowding-in of private pre-tax insurance, but the income eect on labor
supply again runs in the opposite direction. These results are consistent with the em-
pirical literature. In particular, Frydman and Molloy (2011) exploit the relative tax
advantage of dierent forms of CEO pay from 1946 to 2005 and nd that the structure
of compensation responds little to changes in tax rates on labor income. By high-
lighting the two counteracting forces at play  crowding-out versus performance-pay
adjustments  our analysis provides an explanation for these ndings.
4.3 Excess Burden and Welfare Gains
We now derive expressions for the excess burden and the welfare gains of raising the
rate of progressivity of the tax schedule.
Corollary 3. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds. Suppose moreover that ability types
are lognormally distributed, log θ ∼ N (µθ, σ2θ). The excess burden of an increase in




(1− g) (1− p)
− 1
)
εa,1−pC + (εψ,1−p + εψ,a εa,1−p) pψ
2 σ2η C, (41)
where C is the economy's aggregate private consumption, g is the ratio of government
expenditures G to aggregate output Y = C + G, εa,1−p is the labor eort elasticity
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given by (35), and εψ,a =
1
ε
, εψ,1−p = −1 are the pass-through elasticities.
Suppose moreover that the planner is utilitarian, that is, α (θ) = 1 for all θ.25 The
welfare gains (including the mechanical eect) of an increase in the rate of progres-
sivity are given by





C + εψ,1−p ψ
2 σ2η C. (42)
Proof. See Appendix E.
Excess Burden of Raising Progressivity. The rst term in the right-hand side
of (41), [((1− g) (1− p))−1−1]εa,1−pC, is the standard deadweight loss from distorting
labor eort, that is, the behavioral eect of taxation that would arise in a model with
exogenous risk. This eect, equal to the rst integral in equation (28), is increasing in
the elasticity of eort with respect to progressivity (35) that measures the disincentive
eects of raising tax rates, and in the rate of progressivity of the tax code that captures
the share of income losses borne by the government as reduced revenue. Moreover,
government expenditures raise the excess burden of tax progressivity. Intuitively, this
is because a given marginal increase in tax progressivity implies a larger deadweight
loss if the tax burden is already large due to high spending needs.
The second part of equation (41) captures the scal externalities that arise when
private insurance against output risk is endogenous, that is, the two covariance terms
in equation (28). The term εψ,1−pp(ψση)2C is the value of
´
Cov(T ′, ŵco)dF , and
the term εψ,aεa,1−pp(ψση)2C is the value of
´
Cov(T ′, ŵpp)dF . Since εψ,1−p < 0, the
crowding-out eect contributes to reducing the excess burden of the reform, because
it increases the sensitivity of earnings to output risk  by Jensen's inequality, this
generates more tax revenue when the tax schedule is initially progressive (p > 0).
Conversely, since εψ,a, εa,1−p > 0 the performance-pay eect contributes to raising
the excess burden (lowering government revenue) via a reduction in eort and hence
risk exposure. Now recall that, by Corollary 2, the crowding-out eect dominates
the performance-pay eect so that the earnings schedule becomes more risky overall.
Therefore, conditional on the value of the labor eort elasticity, the deadweight loss
of raising taxes is strictly smaller than in the standard model with exogenous risk.
25In the Appendix we consider the more general case where the social welfare weights are given
by α (θ) = e
−α log θ´
e−α log θ′dF (θ′)
for all θ, where α ≥ 0.
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However, we showed in Section 4.2 that the crowding-out and performance-pay eects
almost fully oset each other. We therefore expect the net positive scal externality
to be small in magnitude. We conrm this intuition in Section 5.
Welfare Gains of Raising Progressivity. Finally, equation (42) shows that the
welfare gains (including the mechanical eect) ME+WG of the tax reform is the sum
of two terms. The rst, (1− p) (σ2θ + (ψση)2), captures the insurance gains obtained
by raising the rate of progressivity of the tax schedule, as in a standard optimal
taxation model. Note that tax progressivity insures both the initial ability dierences
θ and the performance shock η passed-through to earnings, that is, both between-
and within-group heterogeneity. The larger their respective variances σ2θ and ψ
2σ2η
and the lower the initial rate of progressivity p ∈ (−∞, 1), the higher the gains of
marginally raising progressivity.
However, recall that the private insurance contract adjusts endogenously to the
policy reform. Since the pass-through elasticity with respect to progressivity is equal
to εψ,1−p = −1, the welfare eect of this crowding-out (last term in equation (42))
satises
εψ,1−pψ
2σ2η < εψ,1−p (1− p)ψ2σ2η = − (1− p)ψ2σ2η.
As a result, the crowding-out more than fully osets the additional insurance against
performance shocks provided by public policy, (1− p)ψ2σ2η. Intuitively, in response to
increased public insurance through higher tax progressivity, the rm adjusts the pre-
tax earnings contract so that total (public plus private) insurance remains unchanged
 there is a one-for-one crowding-out. However, there is an additional force at play.
Recall that in our model, tax changes are intermediated by rms rather than being
directly distributed to individual workers. We saw that as a consequence, the benets
of a tax cut accrue primarily to the richest workers of a given ability group. This
strictly reduces the welfare gains of raising progressivity relative to the benchmark
model with exogenous risk.
Note nally that, while the earnings distribution and government revenue remain
practically unchanged following a tax reform as the crowding-out and performance-
pay eects almost oset each other, the welfare eects of raising progressivity, on the
other hand, can be large in magnitude. Indeed, labor supply adjustments cause only
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second-order changes in welfare by the envelope theorem. As a result, the welfare
implications of crowding-out are not counteracted by those of the performance-pay
eect. We evaluate quantitatively the welfare cost of ignoring the endogeneity of
private insurance in Section 5.3.
4.4 Optimal Rate of Progressivity
We nally gather our results on the excess burden and the welfare gain of tax reforms
to characterize the optimal CRP tax schedule.
Proposition 4. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds, that ability types are lognormally










εa,1−p + (1− p∗) εψ,aεa,1−pψ2σ2η
, (43)
where g = G/Y is the ratio of government spending to output, εa,1−p is the elasticity of




−1 are the pass-through elasticities. In particular, the optimal rate of progressivity is
strictly smaller in the model with endogenous private insurance than in the benchmark
environment with exogenous risk where εψ,1−p = εψ,a = 0.
Proof. See Appendix E.
Formula (43) is obtained by equating the excess burden EB to the welfare gain
(including the mechanical eect) ME + WG of raising progressivity, both derived in
Corollary 3. Consider rst the polar case with exogenous risk, that is, where all
earnings dierences are attributed to exogenous labor productivity shocks θ and η.








)−1 σ2θ + ψ2σ2η
εa,1−p
. (44)
Thus, the optimal rate of progressivity in this model is increasing in the variances of
the ability and performance shock distributions, and decreasing in the elasticity of
eort εa,1−p = ε1+ε . In this benchmark setting, the government trades-o the benets
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of insuring the entire earnings risk, which is determined by the variance of log-earnings
Var (logw) = σ2θ + ψ
2σ2η, with the excess burden of raising progressivity.
Now consider the general model with endogenous partial insurance against per-
formance shocks, so that εψ,1−p < 0 and εψ,a > 0. Equating the excess burden to the
welfare gains of raising progressivity implies that p∗ is the solution to(
1
(1− g) (1− p∗)
− 1
)









from which (43) follows. This formula implies that p∗ is strictly decreasing in σ2η, and
hence that the optimal rate of progressivity is strictly lower than in the previous case.
This is because the positive scal externality and the welfare loss of crowding-out ex-
actly cancel each other out, as they are respectively equal to εψ,1−pp∗Var (logw | θ)
and [(1− p∗)+εψ,1−pp∗]Var (logw | θ), where Var (logw | θ) = ψ2σ2η is the variance of
log-earnings conditional on ability θ. The only remaining term is therefore the neg-
ative scal externality due to the performance-pay eect, εψ,aεa,1−pp∗Var (logw | θ).
This scal externality is captured by the second term in the denominator of (43).
Overall, we obtain that by ignoring these eects, a planner that would ignore the
endogeneity of private insurance would overestimate the optimal rate of tax progres-
sivity.
5 Quantitative Analysis
In Section 5.1 we extend the model of Section 4 to make it suitable for policy analysis.
Specically, we incorporate the coexistence of jobs with and without performance pay
and a Pareto tail for productivity types. We calibrate the model to match several
key moments of U.S. data in Section 5.2. We then analyze the impact of two tax
reforms in Sections 5.3 and 5.4. First, we consider a small reform that increases the
rate of progressivity by one percentage point around the current tax code. Second,
we study a large reform that nearly doubles the current rate of progressivity and
brings the economy to the utilitarian optimum. We nally compare in Section 5.5 the
optimal rate of progressivity in our calibrated model with two important benchmarks:
the optimum in the model without performance-pay jobs, and the progressivity rate
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chosen by a government that would wrongly assume that wage risk is exogenous.
5.1 Quantitative Model
We extend the loglinear model of Section 4 by adding the following elements. A
share π of workers have a performance-pay job, denoted with a subscript m, and the
remaining share 1− π of workers have a normal job (subscript n). The output of the
worker with productivity θ and a job type j ∈ {m,n} is θ(aj + η), where aj is the




is the performance shock. Performance-pay jobs are
subject to the agency frictions described in Section 1. At these jobs, the employer
observes the output but not the eort of the worker nor the performance shock and,
hence, oers a wage which depends on the stochastic output realization according to
the pass-through coecient ψ. Normal jobs, in contrast, are free from agency frictions
and guarantee a risk-free wage.
We treat the job type of a worker as exogenous. In the data, the share of perfor-
mance pay jobs increases with earnings (see Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009);
Grigsby, Hurst, and Yildirmaz (2019)). We allow the share of job types to be cor-
related with productivity by assuming that productivity is drawn from a job-type-
specic Pareto-lognormal distribution (Colombi (1990)). That is, conditional on the
job type j ∈ {n,m}, the log productivity is the sum of independently drawn nor-







θ2 ∼ Exp (λθ,j). We keep government expenditures G xed when comparing dierent
policy scenarii. We derive and analyze the theoretical formula for the optimal rate of
progressivity in this generalized environment in Appendix F.
5.2 Calibration
We calibrate to model to match the evidence on elasticities and wage distribution
in the U.S. We choose the value ε = 0.5 for the Frisch elasticity, which implies a
compensated elasticity of labor supply at normal jobs of approximately 0.3. Both
values are consistent with empirical evidence (Keane (2011); Chetty (2012)).
We assume that log-productivity distributions for both job types have a common




θ and tail parameter λθ,m = λθ,n = λθ. As a result,
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+ πψ2σ2η + π (1− π)
(











is the variance of log-productivity, ψ2σ2η is the variance of log-earnings
at the performance-pay jobs due to the performance shocks, and the last term cap-
tures the contribution of the dierence between the mean log-earnings at normal and
performance-pay jobs.
Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009) study performance-pay jobs using Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and nd that their fraction π was 0.45 in 1998,
the most recent year included in their analysis. They report that performance-pay
jobs have mean hourly wages higher by 30%, and the variance of wages higher by
42%, relative to normal jobs.26 The rst statistic pins down µm−µn = log (1.3). The
second will be crucial in determining σ2η,m, the variance of the performance shock at
performance-pay jobs.
For the levels of the mean and variance of log-earnings in the entire economy, we
turn to the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) which uses data from the Internal
Revenue Service Statistics of Income program to accurately represent the distribution
of high income households. Based on the SCF, Heathcote and Tsujiyama (2019) report
a mean household labor income of $77, 325 and an overall variance of log labor income
of 0.618 in 2007. They also estimate the tail parameter of the log earnings distribution
λθ at 2.2.
Regarding the government policy, Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017)
estimate the empirical rate of tax progressivity at 0.181 and Heathcote and Tsujiyama
(2019) report a ratio of government purchases to output of 18.8 percent.
Given these estimates, we choose σ2θ = 0.31 and σ
2
η,m = 0.4 to match the overall
variance of log-earnings as well as the relative variance between performance-pay and
normal jobs. Matching mean labor income as well as the ratio of mean wage rates
at the two job types implies µθ,m = 3.88 and µθ,n = 3.62. The implied distribution
of wage rates and job types is depicted in Figure 1. The share of performance-pay
jobs is largest in the top quartile of the wage distribution. This is consistent with the
26These values are based on Table 1, Figure IV and Figure V in Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent
(2009). When statistics are available for multiple years, the last year available is used (either 1996
or 1998).
40
Figure 1: Joint distribution of wage rates and job types
(a) (b)
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empirical evidence that bonuses and other forms of performance-related pay are more
prevalent at higher income levels (Lemieux, MacLeod, and Parent (2009); Grigsby,
Hurst, and Yildirmaz (2019)).
5.3 Marginal Reform of Tax Progressivity
Table 1 shows the impact of a small increase of the rate of progressivity by one per-
centage point, from 0.181 to 0.191, on the performance-pay jobs, the normal jobs, and
all jobs. Note that the eects on performance-pay jobs are generally larger in absolute
value, since performance-pay workers have higher average output and earnings than
those in normal jobs. An increase in progressivity leads to a large redistributive gain
for both types of jobs. For the performance-pay workers, an increase of progressivity
would also lead to a substantial gain from better insurance against the earning risk if
this risk was policy-invariant. However, an increase in progressivity generates a large
crowding-out which, as we saw in Section 4, fully osets the gains from insurance
and, in addition, somewhat reduces the gains from redistribution. To understand the
latter eect, note that workers who on average gained from the reform will see their
earnings structure adjusted to keep incentives intact: their consumption will increase
disproportionally in high-output contingencies, which reduces their expected utility
gain. Hence, the crowding-out eect makes redistribution less potent. We nd that,
quantitatively, the redistributive gain for the performance-pay jobs is reduced by 6%.
The excess burden of the reform, EB, is substantially larger for performance-
pay jobs, because the elasticity of eort εa,1−p is 25% greater for these workers. This
dierence in elasticities is only slightly mitigated by the combined impact of the scal
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externalities caused by the crowding-out and performance-pay eects. These eects
have a non-negligible impact on the excess burden when considered separately, but
roughly cancel each other out and lead to a very modest positive scal externality.
To understand this result, recall the excess burden formula obtained in Corollary 3.
Since εψ,1−p = −1, the positive scal externality due to crowding-out relative to the
standard deadweight loss induced by labor supply responses is proportional to the










Since εψ,a = 1ε , the additional negative scal externality due to performance-pay
relative to the standard deadweight loss is proportional to the inverse Frisch elasticity










Therefore, each of these eects signicantly alters the standard calculation of the
excess burden of raising tax progressivity. However, the sum of these eects is
proportional to the dierence between the labor supply and the Frisch elasticities,
1/εa,1−p − 1/ε. Since this dierence is small, the overall scal externality caused by
moral hazard frictions is equal to a mere 2.94% of the standard deadweight loss of
raising tax progressivity. Therefore, this reform is only slightly less costly for the
government budget than one would estimate by ignoring the endogeneity of private
insurance.
5.4 Large Reform: From Status Quo to Optimum
We extend the theoretical optimal progressivity formula to our quantitative model
with two types of jobs in Appendix F. We nd that the utilitarian optimum progres-
sivity rate is given by p∗ = 0.356. This rate is almost double the current progressivity
rate in the U.S., and the implied social welfare increase is equivalent to a 3% increase
in consumption. To get a sense of the magnitude of this reform, note that the average
tax rate, including transfers, of a worker with labor income $33, 000 would decrease
from −0.7% to −14.2%. The tax rate at the mean household income $77, 325 would
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Table 1: Impact of a small increase in the rate of progressivity
Perf.-pay jobs Normal jobs All jobs
Welfare gain ME + WG 354 292 320
due to redistribution 376 292 330
due to insurance 114 0 51
due to crowding-out -136 0 -61
Excess burden EB 137 99 116
due to standard eect 141 99 118
due to crowding-out -25 0 -11
due to performance-pay 21 0 9
Total: ME + WG - EB 217 192 203
Note: The three columns show the mean impact of increasing the progressivity rate by 1 percentage point (0.01) on
the performance-pay jobs, the normal jobs, and all jobs, respectively. All the eects are expressed in USD per
worker in a given job category.
increase from 13.6% to 15.6%. The tax rate at $500, 000, which roughly corresponds
to the top 1% threshold, would increase from 38.4% to 56.6%. In this section we
analyze the impact of a large reform of the current tax code that implements the op-
timal progressivity and adjusts the other tax parameter to keep government revenue
unchanged.
The impact of this reform is depicted in Figure 2 and analyzed in Table 2. Fol-
lowing a large increase in tax progressivity, the earnings schedule is barely altered:
the pass-through of performance shocks to log-earnings increases only modestly from
0.731 to 0.76. As a result, the variance of log-earnings conditional on productivity
increases by 8%, while the overall dispersion of log-earnings among performance pay
workers increases by 2.3%. Given that the pre-tax earnings schedule hardly moves,
this progressivity-increasing reform substantially attens the consumption schedule,
leading to a much better consumption insurance. Indeed, both the individual con-
sumption risk and overall consumption dispersion among performance-pay workers
fall by more than 30%. Better insured workers have weaker incentives to exert eort
which, for our calibrated labor supply elasticity, falls by a substantial 9.6% due the
large magnitude of the tax reform.
Underlying the weak response of the earnings schedule are two countervailing
forces: the crowding-out of private insurance and the performance-pay eect. If rms
attempted to motivate workers to maintain their original level of eort, better private
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Figure 2: Earnings and consumption schedules of performance-pay workers
(a) Earnings schedule (b) Consumption schedule
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+ performance-pay effect (final)
Note: The adjustment of the earnings and consumption schedules for a performance-pay worker with a mean
productivity following an increase of progressivity rate from the current (0.181) to the optimal level (0.356).
Table 2: Earnings and consumption distribution statistics following the large reform
insurance via the income tax would crowd-out private insurance so as to leave the
variance of log-earnings unchanged, since εψ,1−p = −1. For that to happen, the pass-
through would need to increase all the way to 0.93, raising the log-earnings risk of each
performance-pay worker by 62%. However, rms in equilibrium choose a lower eort
level and reduce the power of incentive-pay accordingly. This force  the performance-
pay eect  counteracts the eect of crowding-out and brings the pass-through back
to the vicinity of its original level. The combination of these two eects implies that,
strikingly, the relative fall of log-consumption variance in the aftermath of the tax
reform is nearly identical for the workers at jobs with and without agency frictions.
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5.5 Performance-Pay Jobs and Optimal Progressivity
We now study the importance of performance-pay considerations for the optimal tax
progressivity by comparing the optimal progressivity rate arising in the calibrated
model to two important benchmarks. The rst is the optimal rate of progressivity in
the counterfactual economy without performance-pay jobs, obtained by setting the
variance of the performance shock σ2η,m to zero. The second is the rate of progressivity
that would be chosen by the government who would erroneously assume that the
entire wage risk is exogenous. This rate is found by applying the formula for the
optimal rate of progressivity from the model with exogenous risk to our calibrated
model economy, where wage-rate risk is actually endogenous. Following Rothschild
and Scheuer (2016), we call the resulting progressivity rate a self-conrming policy
equilibrium. The results are depicted in panel (a) of Figure 3.
First, in an economy without performance-pay jobs, the optimal rate of progres-
sivity would increase from 0.356 to 0.41. To understand the discrepancy between the
true optimum and this benchmark, we gradually switch on the various channels re-
lated to performance-pay jobs in the optimum formula (43), starting from an economy
devoid of agency frictions (see panel (b) of Figure 3). First, workers at performance-
pay jobs exert lower eort than those at normal jobs. This leads to a lower output and
hence a higher share of government spending in GDP, G/Y . This in turn contributes
to lower progressivity and explains approximately 30% of the overall progressivity
change. Second, workers at performance-pay jobs face higher wage risk. That raises
the gains of providing social insurance via tax progressivity. However, this additional
benet of insurance is fully canceled by the crowding-out of private insurance. Third,
the labor supply elasticity of performance-pay workers is higher, increasing the excess
burden of raising progressivity and explaining 40% of the progressivity dierence.
Finally, the performance-pay eect contributes to a reduction in government revenue
via a compression of the earnings distribution, which explains the remaining 30%.
Second, we compare the optimal rate of progressivity with the SCPE. In this
equilibrium concept, the government can correctly estimate the elasticity of eort, but
treats wage risk as fully exogenous. Such a policymaker would mistakenly attempt
to insure the endogenous part of the wage risk and choose too high a progressivity
rate, equal to 0.4. However, log-earnings risk at performance-pay jobs increases by a
mere 2.3% relative to its value in the true optimum. Once again, this is due to the
counteracting forces of the crowding-out and the performance pay eects. Finally,
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Figure 3: Optimal progressivity and performance pay jobs
(a) Social welfare functions (b) Optima dierence decomposition
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Note: Panel (b) shows the contributions of various channels through which performance-pay jobs aect the optimal
progressivity rate. These contributions are obtained by successively switching on the respective channels in the
optimal progressivity formula. All the channels combined sum up to the dierence in progressivity rate between the
optimum without performance pay jobs and the optimum in the calibrated model.
ignoring the endogeneity of wage risk does not lead to a large miscalculation of optimal
tax policy: the social welfare cost of choosing the SCPE is equivalent to a 0.24% drop
in consumption. This value implies that increasing the U.S. rate of progressivity
from the status quo to the SCPE reaps 93% of the welfare gains of moving from the
status quo to the full optimum. Recall that this small welfare cost of sub-optimizing
is not a necessary consequence of our theoretical analysis.27 In fact, if there were
only performance-pay jobs in the economy, the dierence in progressivity between
the SCPE and the full optimum would be 0.09 with a welfare dierence equivalent to
1% change of consumption. Since in our calibration only roughly half of the jobs are
performance-based, the impact on the progressivity rate is half of that. Furthermore,
as the social welfare function is concave in p, half of the change in progressivity
translates into a quarter of the change in social welfare.
5.6 Incidence of Other Tax Reforms
Recall that our theoretical tax incidence analysis of Section 2 gives us in closed-form
the incidence of arbitrary tax reforms. Specically, we can apply the theoretical
formulas of Theorem 1 to reforms that do not keep the CRP structure of the tax
27Indeed, by the envelope theorem, the performance-pay eect is (at least locally) only second-
order relative to the crowding-out eect from a welfare point of view. Thus, the two eects do not
oset each other as they did when we studied the incidence on earnings and government revenue.
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code.28 We specialize our theoretical analysis to such reforms and study the direction
of the crowding-out and the performance-pay eects in Appendix E. Here we propose
two quantitative experiments.
First, in Figure 4 we depict the incidence of canonical tax reforms on the earnings
schedule of a worker with mean ability and a performance-pay job. Specically, we
consider a $100 increase in lump-sum transfer as well as a 1 percentage point increase
in marginal tax rates over a varying range of earnings, namely, for all earnings, for the
top 50% earnings, and for the top 10% earnings. Our robust nding is that although
the crowding-out eect (dashed black curves) contributes to higher earnings risk,
it is mostly oset by the performance-pay eect (dashed-dotted blue curves). In the
case of an additional lump-sum transfer, the performance-pay eect osets more than
50% of the impact of crowding-out on the variance of log-earnings. For a uniform
increase in marginal tax rates, the oset is more than 90%. When marginal tax
rates are increased only for highest incomes, the oset rate even exceeds 100%: the
performance-pay eect dominates the crowding-out eect and the earnings risk falls on
net. To understand why the oset rate can be so high, recall that tax reforms which
increase progressivity generate larger eort responses of performance-pay workers
than reforms which spread the same tax burden in a more uniform manner  see
Lemmas 1 and 2 and the subsequent discussions. Increasing marginal tax rates over
a smaller range of high potential earnings  a progressive tax reform  generates a
relatively larger eort response and, hence, a more substantial performance-pay eect
in comparison to the crowding-out eect.
Second, in Figure 5, rather than focusing on a single earnings contract as in
the previous paragraph, we study the impact of an increase in the top marginal
tax rate in our calibrated economy with workers that are heterogeneous in ex-ante
ability. Specically, we consider a 1 percentage point increase in the marginal tax
rate faced by the top 1% income earners, that is, above $441,000 in 2007 dollars. This
hypothetical top tax bracket is depicted by the vertical dotted line in the left panel.
The left (resp., right) panel gives the results as a function of mean earnings (resp.,
mean earnings percentile). This reform leads to a direct crowd-out which, ceteris
paribus, increases the earnings risk for all workers in the top 5% of mean earnings,
particularly so in the top 1%. This crowding-out is represented by the dashed black
28The only diculty consists of computing the eort change â (θ) in response to these reforms.
We do so by solving the rst-order condition (7) numerically.
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Figure 4: Incidence of tax reforms: crowding-out and performance-pay eects
(a) Increase of lump-sum transfer (b) Increase of mg. tax rates (uniform)
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(c) Increase of mg. tax rates (top 50%) (d) Increase of mg. tax rates (top 10%)
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Note: Tax incidence computed for a worker with mean productivity. Panel (a) depicts an increase of the lump-sum
transfer by $100 (in 2007 dollars). Panels (b-d) depict an increase of the marginal tax rate by 1 pp for all earnings,
for the top 50% earnings and for the top 10% earnings, respectively. The performance-pay eect osets the impact
of the crowding-out eect on the variance of log earnings by 52% (a), 92% (b), 136% (c) and 314% (d).
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Figure 5: Increase of the top tax rate: impact on earnings risk
(a) (b)
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Note: Log-earnings risk is measured by V ar(log(w(θ, η) | θ). The vertical dashed line in the left panel indicates the
hypothetical top tax bracket threshold.
curves in both panels. However, the results change dramatically when we take into
account labor eort responses. The performance-pay eect more than osets the
crowding-out eect everywhere apart from the very top earners, leading to a lower
earnings risk for all workers below 99.5 percentile. Only the very top 0.5% experience
any net crowding-out, but even for them the performance-pay eect osets more than
70% of the additional pre-tax earnings risk.
Conclusion
We have set up and analyzed a tractable environment in which rms provide work-
ers with endogenous private insurance against stochastic performance shocks in the
face of moral hazard frictions. The government uses the tax-and-transfer system to
redistribute income across workers who dier in uninsurable innate ability. The key
feature of our model is that earnings risk is endogenous and has a productive role.
The main and surprising conclusion of our analysis is that standard models that ig-
nore the endogeneity of wage-rate risk actually come very close to evaluating the
incidence of taxes on earnings contract, as well as the optimal level of tax progres-
sivity. Underlying this result are two countervailing forces at play  a crowding-out
and a performance-pay eect  which prevent taxes from having a large impact on
the structure of performance-based compensation.
It would be interesting to extend our analysis in several directions. First, we only
considered the impact of taxes on compensation for already existing performance-pay
jobs. One could also model the incentives for rms to create such performance-pay
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jobs (rather than normal jobs) in the rst place, and study the incidence of tax
reforms on the extensive margin of switching from one type of job to another. Sec-
ond, in our model, private markets are constrained ecient and perfectly competitive.
In other words, we gave private markets their best chance in making government
policy redundant. Introducing frictions such as adverse selection in private markets 
whereby rms cannot perfectly observe a worker's innate ability  and market power
are natural next steps. Third, our theoretical analysis delivers predictions regarding
the impact of various types of tax reforms on the structure of incentive-based com-
pensation via counteracting crowding-out and performance-pay eects. Testing these
predictions empirically should be particularly fruitful.
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A Proofs of Section 1
Concavity of the Utility of Earnings. Our analysis requires that the utility of
earnings w 7→ v (w) ≡ u (R (w)) is concave. It is easy to show that this is equivalent
to
π1 (w) π2 (w) > −γ (w) (46)
where γ (w) ≡ −R(w)u
′′(R(w))
u′(R(w))
is the agent's coecient of relative risk aversion, and
π1 (w) ≡ 1−T (w)/w1−T ′(w) , π2 (w) ≡
wT ′′(w)
1−T ′(w) are two measures of the local rate of progressivity
of the tax schedule. Specically, the parameterπ1 (w) is the ratio of the average and
marginal retention rates, and π2 (w) is (minus) the elasticity of the retention rate with
respect to income. If the tax schedule has a constant rate of progressivity p (CRP),
these variables are respectively equal to 1
1−p and p. Note that most of our analysis
is concerned with the incidence of tax reforms around a given initial tax schedule T .
In this case, (46) is a restriction on the initial tax code T and can be easily veried
in the data for practical applications. Note moreover that the tax reform itself is not
restricted. When we characterize the optimal tax schedule within the CRP class, we
assume that u (c) = log c which implies that γ (w) = −1. It is easy to verify that in
this case condition (46) is always satised regardless of the value of p.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof of this proposition follows directly from the
results of Edmans and Gabaix (2011) since the utility of earnings v (·) is concave.
We give here a heuristic proof of the main arguments. Given the earnings contract
{w (θ, η) : y ∈ R}, an agent with ability θ and performance shock η chooses eort a (θ)





so that the rst-order condition reads
r (w (θ, η))u′ (R (w (θ, η)))
∂w (θ, η)
∂η
= h′ (a (θ)) . (47)
This equation pins down the slope of the earnings schedule that the rm must im-
plement in order to induce the eort level a (θ). Integrating this incentive constraint
over η given a (θ) leads to
u (R (w (θ, η))) = h′ (a (θ)) η + k, (48)
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for some constant k ∈ R. Since in equilibrium the participation constraint (4) must
hold with equality, the agent's expected utility must be equal to his reservation value
U (θ). Therefore, the value of k must be chosen by the rm such that the agent's
participation constraint holds with equality. Imposing the participation constraint
with E [η] = 0 implies
k = U (θ) + h (a (θ)) . (49)
The previous two equations fully characterize the wage contract given the desired
eort level a (θ) and the reservation value U (θ). They imply that, for a given pair
(a (θ) , U (θ)), the wage given performance shock η satises:
u (R (w (θ, η))) = h′ (a (θ)) η + [U (θ) + h (a (θ))] . (50)
Next, equation (7) is obtained by taking the rst-order condition with respect to a (θ)
in the rm's problem (2), taking as given the earnings contract (6) required to satisfy
the workers' incentive and participation constraints (3, 4). Finally, equation (8) is
simply a rewriting of (5).
B Proofs of Section 2
Proof of Theorem 1. Recall that, given the eort level a and the reservation value
U (θ), earnings as a function of the noise realization η (or equivalently output y =
θ (a+ η)) satises:
u (w (θ, η)− T (w (θ, η))) = U (θ) + h (a (θ)) + h′ (a (θ)) η.
In response to the tax reform δT̂ , the perturbed wage contract satises
u
[
w (θ, η) + δŵ (θ, η)− T (w (θ, η) + δŵ (θ, η))− δT̂ (w (θ, η))
]
= U (θ) + δÛ (θ) + h (a (θ) + δâ (θ)) + h′ (a (θ) + δâ (θ)) η.
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Dierentiating with respect to δ and evaluating at δ = 0 leads to[
(1− T ′ (w (θ, η))) ŵ (θ, η)− T̂ (w (θ, η))
]
u′ (w (θ, η)− T (w (θ, η)))
= Û (θ) + [h′ (a (θ)) + h′′ (a (θ)) η] â (θ) .
Solving for ŵ (θ, η) leads to
ŵ (θ, η) =
T̂ (w (θ, η))
r (w (θ, η))
+
Û (θ)
r (w (θ, η))u′ (R (w (θ, η)))
+
h′ (a (θ)) + h′′ (a (θ)) η
r (w (θ, η))u′ (R (w (θ, η)))
â (θ) .
Adding and subtracting w (θ, η) â(θ)
a(θ)
, that is, the earnings adjustment obtained in the
model with exogenous risk, and substituting expression (17) derived below for the
impact of the reform on expected utility Û (θ), easily yields (14).
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall that the reservation value satises E [w (θ, η)] =
θa (θ). Hence, in response to the tax reform, we get
E [w (θ, η) + δŵ (θ, η)] = θ (a (θ) + δâ (θ)) ,
that is, E [ŵ (θ, η)] = θâ (θ). Substituting expression (14) for ŵ (θ, η) in this equation
leads to
θâ (θ) = E
[
T̂ (w (θ, η))










h′ (a (θ)) + h′′ (a (θ)) η
r (w (θ, η))u′ (R (w (θ, η)))
]
â (θ) .
Using equation (7) that denes optimal eort and solving for Û (θ) leads to (17).
Proof of Lemma 1. Recall the optimal eort condition
E
[
h′ (a (θ)) + h′′ (a (θ)) η




Following a tax reform T̂ , the perturbed level of eort satises
E
 h′ (a (θ) + δâ (θ)) + h′′ (a (θ) + δâ (θ)) η{




R (w̃ (θ, η))− δT̂ (w̃ (θ, η))
}
 = θ,
where we denote w̃ (θ, η) ≡ w (θ, η)+δŵ (θ, η). Taking the derivative of this expression
with respect to δ evaluated at δ = 0 gives
0 = E
[
h′′ (a (θ)) + h′′′ (a (θ)) η





h′ (a (θ)) + h′′ (a (θ)) η




−T ′′ (w) ŵ − T̂ ′ (w)
]
u′ (R (w)) + r (w)
[




where the arguments (θ, η) have been removed from the second line for notational
conciseness. Suppose that the utility function is quasilinear in consumption, and the
tax schedule is initially ane. Equation (51) can then be rewritten as
0 = E
[






h′ (a (θ)) + h′′ (a (θ)) η
(1− τ)2

















ηT̂ ′ (w (y | θ))
]
.
Solving for â (θ) and letting ε (θ) = h
′(a(θ))
a(θ)h′′(a(θ))
easily leads to (18).
Proof of Proposition 3. Solving for â (θ) in equation (51) implies that the Gateaux
derivative of eort is given by
â (θ) = −E
[
ε̄a,R (θ, η)
T̂ (w (θ, η))





T̂ ′ (w (θ, η))









where p (w) ≡ wT
′′(w)
1−T ′(w) is the local rate of progressivity of the tax schedule, and where
ε̄a,R, ε̄a,r denote the income eect parameter and compensated elasticity along the
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linearized budget constraint, equal to
ε̄a,r (θ, η) =
h′ (a (θ))




















ε̄a,R (θ, η) =
h′ (a (θ))



















Now substitute equations (14, 17) for ŵ (θ, η) in the previous equation, and solve for
â (θ) to get{
1− E
[
(ε̄a,R (θ, η)− p (w (θ, η)) ε̄a,r (θ, η))
h′ (a (θ)) + h′′ (a (θ)) η






T̂ (w (θ, η))





T̂ ′ (w (θ, η))




(ε̄a,R (θ, η)− p (w (θ, η)) ε̄a,r (θ, η))
T̂ (w (θ, η))









(v′ (w (θ, ·)))−1
]]E[ T̂ (w (θ, η))
r (w (θ, η))
]
.






T̂ (w (θ, η))





T̂ ′ (w (θ, η))
r (w (θ, η))
]
where the income eect parameter and compensated elasticity now account for the
nonlinearity of the budget constraint (due to the fact that ŵ depends on T̂ ) and the
endogeneity of the reservation value (due to the fact that ŵ depends on Û) and are
given by
εEw,R (θ, η) =









] w (θ, η)
1 + E
[


























This concludes the proof.
C Allowing for Non-Constant Eort
In this section we extend our tax incidence analysis to the case where the rm can oer an
eort schedule a(θ, η), rather than imposing a constant eort level a(θ) as in the main body
of the paper. The rm which employs a worker with productivity θ solves
max
w(θ,·),a(θ,·)
E[θa(θ, η)− w(θ, η)]
subject to incentive-compatibility constraints
a(θ, η) ∈ argmax
a
v(w(θ, η))− h(a(θ, η)) for all η,
and the participation constraint
E [v(w(θ, η))− h(a(θ, η))] ≥ U(θ).
From Edmans and Gabaix (2011) we know that the optimal contract satises




where K ∈ R. Using the binding participation constraint to solve for K, we obtain









Unlike in the model with a single eort level, the slope of the ex-post utility potentially










Edmans and Gabaix (2011) show that all incentive-compatible eort schedules are such that
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a(θ, η) + η is increasing with η. This implies that the above slope is non-negative and that
earnings are increasing with performance.







where fη denotes the density of the performance shock η. To compute the derivative of the
expected wage on the right-hand side, rst consider the derivative of the wage w(θ, η) with







v′(w(θ,η)) if η < η
′,
h′(a(θ,η′))
v′(w(θ,η′)) − (1− Fη(η
′))h
′′(a(θ,η′))
v′(w(θ,η′)) if η = η
′,
h′′(a(θ,η′))
v′(w(θ,η)) − (1− Fη(η
′))h
′′(a(θ,η′))
v′(w(θ,η)) if η > η
′.
(54)
Notice that increasing the eort level conditional on the output shock η′ requires lowering
earnings for worse performance (η < η′) and increasing earnings for better performance






















Plugging this expression into the rst-order condition (53) yields the following rst-order





















The left-hand side is the marginal benet from providing higher eort, equal to the expected
output gain. The right-hand side consists of two terms: the marginal rate of substitution
(MRS) and the marginal cost of incentives (MCI). The MRS is the expected wage cost of
compensating the agent for higher eort in contingency η′. The MCI, on the other hand, is
the expected wage cost of making the adjusted eort schedule incentive-compatible. As we
noted above, increasing eort level conditional on output η′ requires increasing earnings for
better performance and reducing them for worse performance. Since earnings are increas-
ing with performance and v is concave, such earnings adjustments are costly for the rm:
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MCI ≥ 0.
The following theorem extends the results of Theorem 1 to the model where non-
degenerate eort schedules are allowed.
Theorem 3. Denote by â (θ, η) the change in eort schedule induced by the reform. Suppose
that the original eort schedule is such that a(θ, η) > 0 for all η. The rst-order eect of
the tax reform T̂ on earnings w (θ, ·) is given by
ŵ (θ, η) = ŵex (θ, η) + ŵco (θ, η) + ŵpp (θ, η)
where ŵex (θ, η) = θâ(θ, η), the crowding-out eect ŵco has mean zero and is given by
ŵco (θ, η) =
T̂ (w (θ, η))
r (w (θ, η))
− (v
′ (w (θ, η)))−1
E
[
(v′ (w (θ, ·)))−1
] E[ T̂ (w (θ, ·))
r (w (θ, ·))
]
and the performance-pay eect ŵpp has mean zero and is given by

















Proof. Consider a reform R̂ = −T̂ . Following the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 1,
we can show that the change in wages is equal to






















































′)θâ(θ, η′)dη′ = E[θâ(θ, η′)]
where in the rst equality we changed the order of integration and in the second equality
we applied the rst-order condition for eort (53). This implies that the performance-pay
eect has mean zero. By the free-entry condition we have E[θâ(η′)] = E[ŵ(η′)]. Hence,











It follows from Theorem 3 that the crowding-out eect ŵco (θ, η) is exactly the
same as in the simpler setting studied in the main body of the paper (equation (15)).
The performance-pay eect ŵpp (θ, η) is more complex than in the simpler model
(equation (16)). However, it is a natural extension of the expression obtained under
the constant-eort assumption. Namely, the only substantial dierence is that the
term h
′′(a(θ))â(θ)
v′(w(θ,η)) η from (16), which measures the change in earnings necessary to elicit






interpretation of this term is analogous to its counterpart in the simpler model. The
only added diculty is that we now have to evaluate the change in the entire eort
schedule â(θ, ·) in response to the reform, rather than a scalar value â(θ).
D Proofs of Section 3
Proof of Theorem 2. Equation (14) implies that the excess burden of the reform
T̂ is equal to
EB(T, T̂ ) = −
ˆ
Θ






T ′ (w (θ, η))
(
T̂ (w (θ, η))
r (w (θ, η))
+
Û (θ)








T ′ (w (θ, η))
(
h′ (a (θ)) + h′′ (a (θ)) η
v′ (w (θ, η))
− w (θ, η)
a (θ)
)]
â (θ) dF (θ) ,
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where Û (θ) is given by (17). Since
E
[
T̂ (w (θ, η))
r (w (θ, η))
+
Û (θ)




h′ (a (θ)) + h′′ (a (θ)) η
v′ (w (θ, η))














T ′ (w (θ, η)) ,
T̂ (w (θ, η))
r (w (θ, η))
+
Û (θ)








T ′ (w (θ, η)) ,
[
h′ (a (θ)) + h′′ (a (θ)) η
v′ (w (θ, η))






This expression easily leads to equation (28).
Next, the welfare gain of the tax reform is given by








(v′ (w (θ, η)))−1
]E[ T̂ (w (θ, η))














(v′ (w (θ, ·)))−1
] T̂ (w (θ, η))















(v′ (w (θ, ·)))−1
]u′ (R (w (θ, η))) T̂ (w (θ, η))] dF (θ) .
This leads to equation (29).
When taxes are unrestricted, the marginal value of public funds λ can be ob-
tained as follows. Consider a uniform lump-sum transfer, represented by the reform
T̂ ∗∗ (w) = −1 for all w. Denoting by â∗∗ (θ) the eect of this reform on eort (via a





T ′ (w (θ, η))
− 1
















T ′ (w (θ, η))
(
h′ (a (θ)) + h′′ (a (θ)) η
v′ (w (θ, η))
)]
â∗∗ (θ) dF (θ) .
Consider now the reform in direction T̂ ∗∗ (w) = −1, normalized to reduce government
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revenue by 1 dollar after all behavioral responses have been accounted for. This reform
is represented by T̂ ∗ = −1|R̂(T,T̂ ∗∗)| . Its eect on government revenue is R̂(T, T̂
∗) = −1
by construction, and its eect on social welfare is given by
λ ≡ Ŵ(T, T̂










r (w (θ, η))
]
dF (θ) .
Finally, we show that the optimal tax schedule must satisfy equation (27) for
any tax reform T̂ . To do so, consider an arbitrary tax reform T̂ , normalized with-
out loss of generality so that its mechanical eect is equal to 1 dollar, that is,´
E
[
T̂ (w (θ, η))
]
dF (θ) = 1. Denote its eect on government revenue by R̂(T, T̂ )
and its eect on social welfare by Ŵ(T, T̂ ). Redistribute any tax revenue gain (or
levy any tax revenue loss) from this reform via the reform T̂ ∗ described in the previous
paragraph, that is, a uniform lump-sum transfer that reduces government budget by
1 dollar. The tax reform
T̂ + R̂(T, T̂ )T̂ ∗ ≡ T̂ + R̂(T, T̂ ) −1∣∣∣R̂(T,−1)∣∣∣
is, by construction, budget-neutral. Its eect on social welfare is given by
Ŵ(T, T̂ ) + R̂(T, T̂ )
Ŵ(T, T̂ ∗)∣∣∣R̂(T,−1)∣∣∣ = Ŵ(T, T̂ ) + λR̂(T, T̂ ).
Of course, the marginal value of public funds λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the
government budget constraint. Now, the optimal tax schedule is such that every
budget-neutral tax reform has a zero eect on social welfare (see, for instance, Luen-
berger (1997)), that is, for all T̂ ,
Ŵ(T, T̂ ) + λR̂(T, T̂ ) = 0.
But recall that 1
λ
Ŵ(T, T̂ ) = WG(T, T̂ ) and R̂(T, T̂ ) = 1− EB(T, T̂ ), by denition of
the welfare gains and the excess burden. This immediately implies the characteriza-
tion (27).
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E Proofs of Section 4
Proof of Corollary 1. Suppose that the tax schedule is CRP, so that R (w) =
1−τ
1−pw
1−p. Equation (48) then implies that in order to induce agents with ability
θ to choose the same eort a regardless of their noise realization η, the earnings
contract must satisfy:
















for some k ∈ R. Thus, log-earnings are linear in the performance shock η = y
θ
− a
that the rm infers upon observing realized output y. Imposing that the agent's
participation constraint holds with equality pins down the value of k as a function of
U (θ). Namely, equation (49) implies:
































Below we derive the equilibrium value of the reservation utility U (θ) and obtain the
equilibrium wage given (a, η):














Dene the sensitivity of the before-tax and after-tax wages to output in the optimal









respectively. We have ψ (θ, η) = a
1/ε
1−p and ψ
c (θ, η) = a1/ε. Both ψ (θ, η) and ψc (θ, η)
depend on the tax schedule through its eect on optimal eort, and there is an addi-
tional crowding-out eect on the before-tax sensitivity.
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v′ (w (θ, η))
+
h′′ (a)
















E [w (θ, η) η] .
We have









































where we used the fact that that η is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance
σ2η so that E [exη] = e
1
2
x2σ2η for any x. Moreover, we have E [ηexη] = xσ2e 12x2σ2η for
any x. Indeed, let ϕ the (normal) pdf of η. We have ϕ′ (η) = − η
σ2η
ϕ (η), so that
E [ηexη] =
´
ηexηϕ (η) dη = −σ2η
´
exηϕ′ (η) dη = xσ2η
´




the third equality follows from an integration by parts.


















































































































Now use the free-entry condition: equation (5) and the expression derived above for
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1−p = θa. (60)











σ2η = 1− p. (61)
Using the denition ψ ≡ a
1
ε
1−p for the pass-through easily leads to (31). Note that if










Finally, taking logs in equation (60) and dening ψ ≡ a
1
ε
1−p easily leads to (32).
Proof of Corollary 2. Consider a tax reform that marginally raises the rate of pro-
gressivity p by a small amount δ → 0. The direction T̂ of this tax reform satises(










= δT̂ (w) + o (δ) .
This leads to the representation (34).











































ε = 1− p.























We conclude by expressing this elasticity in terms of the pass-through elasticities. We
have ψ = a
1
ε
1−p and εψ,a =
1
ε
















But the rst-order condition for labor eort reads




















This easily yields equation (35).
Expression (36) for ŵex (θ, η) is immediate since âa =
1
1−pεa,1−p by denition. To
obtain the performance-pay eect (38), we show that for any (not necessarily CRP)
tax reform T̂ ,




ŵex (y | θ) . (63)
This equation implies that ŵpp (θ, η) has mean zero, but is dispersed around the mean
whenever εψ,a > 0, since the map η 7→ ψη− ψ2σ2η is strictly increasing. To prove this
equation, note that
h′ (a (θ)) + h′′ (a (θ)) η
v′ (w (θ, η))
â (θ) =
R (w (θ, η))













































where the third equality uses the rst-order condition for labor eort.
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Next, we compute the crowding-out eect ŵco (θ, η). We have
T̂ (w (θ, η))
r (w (θ, η))
=
1
(1− τ) (w (θ, η))−p
(
















w (θ, η) ,
and
Û (θ)








]E[ T̂ (w (θ, ·))




























Summing these expressions yields equation (37).
Summing all the eects, we can easily verify that the incidence of the reform is
given by
∂ logw (θ, η)
∂ (1− p)





which is the expression as we would obtain by directly dierentiating logw (θ, η) =
log (θa) + ψη − 1
2
ψ2σ2η.
Note that the earnings adjustment ŵi (θ, η) contributes to raising the sensitivity
of log-earnings to performance shocks (pass-through function) i
∂
∂η
log (w (θ, η) + δŵi (θ, η))−
∂
∂η
log (w (θ, η)) > 0.
For δ close enough to zero this inequality is equivalent to
∂ŵ (θ, η)
∂η
> ŵi (θ, η)












+ ŵpp (θ, η)
ψ
ψη − ψ2σ2η
= ŵpp (θ, η)
∂ log (w (θ, η))
∂η




Thus, since â < 0, we obtain ∂ŵpp(θ,η)
∂η
< ŵpp (y | θ) ∂ log(w(θ,η))∂η and the reform lowers
the sensitivity of log-earnings to output. Analogously, the crowding-out eect lowers
raises the sensitivity of log-earnings since εψ,1−p < 0.



































= 2ψ2σ2η − ε− 1.
where the second to last equality uses equation (35).
Proof of Corollary 3. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds, and that ability types
are lognormally distributed, that is, log θ ∼ N (µθ, σ2θ). We substitute formula (34)
for the tax reform T̂ in equations (28) and (29) to compute each term of the excess
burden and the welfare gains of marginally raising progressivity. The algebra is
straightforward but tedious. It is available upon request and we only summarize our









µθ + ln a−
1
1− p




























(θa) dF (θ) = aeµθ+
σ2θ
2 .
Note that in our baseline economy with government expenditures G, we have Y =
C +G. The excess burden of the tax reform in the model with exogenous risk (that









dF (θ) = − 1
1− p
(Y − (1− p)C) εa,1−p.





T ′ (w (θ, η)) ,
T̂ (w (θ, η))

























T ′ (w (θ, η)) ,
Û (θ)




















Thus the total scal externality from the crowding-out eect is equal to pψ2σ2ηC. The





T ′ (w (θ, η)) ,
h′ (a (θ)) + h′′ (a (θ)) η
v′ (w (θ, η))






Suppose that the social welfare weights are given by α (θ) = e
−α log θ´
e−α log θ′dF (θ′)
for all θ,
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(v′ (w (θ, η)))−1
E
[
(v′ (w (θ, ·)))−1
]α (θ)u′ (R (w (θ, η))) T̂ (w (θ, η))] dF (θ)








Third, we compute the marginal value of public funds λ in the loglinear model,
when the tax code is restricted to the CRP class. To do so, rst consider a reform of
the parameter τ , represented by formula (64). By denition, the parameter lambda
is the eect on social welfare caused by a tax reform in this direction, normalized to
raise government revenue by 1 dollar. The mechanical eect of the (non-normalized)











Since the elasticity of labor eort is εa,1−τ = 0, the standard excess burden and the
scal externality caused by the performance-pay eect are both equal to zero,
ˆ
Θ




Cov (T ′ (w (θ, η)) , ŵpp (θ, η)) dF (θ) = 0.





T ′ (w (θ, η)) ,
T̂ (w (θ, η))








T ′ (w (θ, η)) ,
Û (θ)















(v′ (w (θ, η)))−1
E
[
(v′ (w (θ, ·)))−1
]α (θ)u′ (R (w (θ, η))) T̂ (w (θ, η))] dF (θ) = − 1
1− τ
.
Now, normalize the tax reform of the tax rate τ so that it delivers $1 of revenue.
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Since the sum of all the scal externalities is zero, the increase in government revenue
of the tax reform T̂ = 1
1−pw
1−p is simply of mechanical eect C
1−τ . Thus, we consider








(w (θ, η))1−p .
The welfare impact of distributing an additional dollar of tax revenue via a reduction











This gives the marginal value of public funds λ in this setting and concludes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. We give two proofs of this result. First, we apply formula
(27) using the explicit expressions of each term derived in the proof of Proposition 3
above. We must have, letting α (θ) = 1 for all θ,
0 =
[
µθ + ln a−
1
1− p




















































































which easily yields the result.
The second proof consists of directly calculating the optimal rate of progressivity
in the loglinear model by equating to zero the derivative of social welfare in this
environment. To do so, recall that the earnings schedule of agents with ability θ can
be written as




and their expected utility as





+ (1− p) log (θa)− 1
2
(1− p) (ψση)2 − h (a) .
Utilitarian social welfare is therefore equal to
ˆ
Θ
U (θ) dF (θ) = (1− p)µθ + (1− p) log a− (1− p)
ψ2σ2η
2















− h′ (a) .
Now recall that expected pre-tax and post-tax earnings are respectively given by








E [R (w (θ, η))] f (θ) dθ = aeµθ+
σ2θ










































As a result, maximizing with respect to 1− p leads to:














































































































Rearranging this equation leads to the result.
Further Examples of Tax Reforms. We now study the incidence of additional
examples of tax reforms.
Lump-Sum Tax Increase on High Incomes. We focus on the top earners, whose
incomes are located in the highest bracket characterized by a constant tax rate τtop
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and an income threshold wtop. Thus, the baseline tax schedule T is locally ane,
that is, T (w) = T (wtop) + τtop (w − wtop) for all w > wtop. Moreover, we assume
that w (y | θ) > wtop for all y. A uniform lump-sum increase of the income tax
liabilities of these agents is represented by the tax reform T̂ (w) = 1 for all w > wtop.
(Equivalently, T̂ can be any positive constant.) Indeed, the perturbed tax schedule is
then given by T + δT̂ = T + δ. Thus, the tax function is shifted up by the constant
δ < 0. The value of the Gateaux derivative Ψ̂(T, T̂ ) then gives the rst-order eect
of this lump-sum transfer on the functional Ψ as its size δ becomes small.
Applying formulas (15) and (16) leads to the following results. The earnings
adjustment caused by crowding-out is equal to





′ (w (θ, η)))−1
E
[
(v′ (w (θ, ·)))−1
]) .
Intuitively, a uniform lump-sum tax increase can be fully absorbed by the rm via a
counteracting lump-sum increase in earnings, without any change in private insurance.
Thus, the rst element of crowding-out is constant. On the other hand, the second
element of crowding-out is decreasing in the performance shock. This is because
the tax increase reduces expected utility Û (θ). To preserve incentive compatibility,
this is achieved by reducing pre-tax earnings by larger amounts for higher-income
workers, since their marginal utility is smaller. As a result, ∂
∂η
ŵco (θ, η) < 0, so that
the crowding-out eect reduces the sensitivity of pre-tax earnings to performance.
On the other hand, the sum of the standard labor supply eect ŵex (θ, η) and the
performance-pay eect ŵpp (θ, η) is increasing, so that the labor supply responses
raise the performance sensitivity of the contract. Indeed, a lump-sum tax increase
creates a pure income eect and hence raises optimal eort, that is, â (θ) > 0. Im-
plementing this higher eort level requires an increase in the sensitivity of earnings
to performance shocks. Overall, a uniform tax increase can lead to either a spread or
a contraction in the pre-tax earnings schedule, depending on the size of the income
eect for high-income earners.
Marginal Tax Rate Increase on High Incomes. Focusing again on the highest
income tax bracket, an increase in the top marginal tax rate is represented by the tax
reform T̂ (w) = w − wtop for all w > wtop. Indeed, the perturbed tax payments are
then given by T (w) + δT̂ (w) = T (w) + δ (w − wtop), and the marginal tax rates are
80
perturbed by the constant δT̂ ′ (w) = δ for w ≥ wtop. We obtain the following results.
Assuming that the utility function is logarithmic, we nd that the crowding-out eect
is equal to
ŵco (θ, η) =
1
(1− τ) Π
(w (θ, η)− E [w (θ, η)]) ,
where Π = E [w (θ, η)] /wtop. Thus, ∂∂η ŵco (θ, η) > 0, so that the crowding-out eect
raises the sensitivity of pre-tax earnings to performance shocks. Note that if the base-
line tax code is linear and the tax rates increase uniformly for the whole population,
the crowding-out eect is equal to zero. On the other hand, the sum of the standard
labor supply eect ŵex (θ, η) and the performance-pay eect ŵpp (θ, η) is increasing if
the reform reduces optimal eort, â (θ) < 0, which raises the performance sensitivity
of the contract. The larger the average uncompensated elasticity of labor supply, the
stronger the performance-pay eect relative to the crowding-out eect, the more an
increase in top tax rates reduces the dispersion of earnings at the top. Overall, the
eect of this reform on the earnings distribution is ambiguous.
Proportional Decrease in Retention Rates. Suppose that Assumption 2 holds.
Consider a tax reform that raises the parameter τ of the CRP tax schedule by a small
amount δ. The direction T̂ of this tax reform is such that(










= δT̂ (w) + o (δ) .




w1−p, ∀w > 0. (64)
Note that this reform changes the retention rates r (w), in percentage terms, by




1−T ′(w) = −
1
(1−τ)(1−p) . Therefore, it amounts to a
proportional reduction in retention rates.
Applying formula (14) to the tax reform (64) yields the following results. The two
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components of crowding-out are equal to
T̂ (w (θ, η))
r (w (θ, η))
=
(v′ (w (θ, η)))−1
E
[
(v′ (w (θ, ·)))−1
] E[ T̂ (w (θ, ·))




(1− τ) (1− p)
.
That is, in response to a tax reform that reduces all retention rates by the same
percent amount (and hence raises marginal tax rates), the rm rst increases all
workers' salaries in proportion to their initial earnings in order to counteract their
net income losses and keep their incentives unchanged. But the reform also reduces
rents and hence leads rms to reduce salaries also in proportion to the workers' initial
earnings. Indeed, since the utility function is logarithmic, this ensures that all agents'
utilities decrease by the same amount. Therefore, we obtain that the total crowding
out of private insurance by the reform, ŵco (θ, η), is equal to zero.
Now, the standard labor supply eect ŵex (θ, η) and the performance-pay eect
ŵpp (θ, η) are both also equal to zero because, by equation (31), the optimal eort
level depends only on the rate of progressivity and not on the tax parameter τ .
Intuitively, eort remains constant because the utility function is logarithmic, so that
the substitution and income eects cancel out. As a result, the earnings schedule is
completely unaected by the reform.
F Proofs of Section 5
In this section we derive the optimal progressivity formula in the quantitative model.
The eort and the expected utility (conditional on ability θ) of a normal worker are









+ (1− p) log(θan)− h(an).






















where the endogenous pass-through ψ is equal a
1/ε
m
























+(1− π) ((1− p) log(an)− h(an))
where the distribution of productivities at performance-pay jobs Fm(θ) is Pareto-
lognormal with parameters (µθ,m, σ2θ , λθ), and the distribution of productivities at
normal jobs Fn(θ) is Pareto-lognormal with parameters (µθ,n, σ2θ , λθ). We derive the
optimality condition by dierentiating W with respect to 1−p, applying the envelope











+ πµθ,m + (1− π)µθ,n +
1
λθ







For each rate of progressivity, the other tax parameter τ is chosen to balance the
government budget subject to xed government spending G. Therefore, the resource














































































µθ,n + (1− p)σ2θ + εan,1−p + log(an)
)
where εY,1−p ≡ ymεam,1−p + ynεan,1−p is the elasticity of the aggregate income with
respect to 1 − p, g = G
Y
is the share of government spending in output and cj is
the share of jobs of type j ∈ {m,n} in the aggregate consumption. Plugging this













λθ − (1− p)
+ (1− p)σ2θ + π(1− p)(1 + εψ,1−p)ψ2σ2η,m





− p (1 + εψ,1−p + εam,1−pεψ,am)
)
ψ2σ2η,m
where yj is the share of jobs of type j ∈ {m,n} in the aggregate output. The above
formula collapses to the formulas with only performance pay jobs when π = 1 and the
standard progressivity formula when π = 0 (in both cases the blue terms disappear).
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The rst term is the standard deadweight loss from rising the progressivity rate ad-
justed by the government spending, evaluated using the elasticity of aggregate income
εY,1−p ≡ ymεam,1−p+ynεan,1−p. The second term is a correction to the deadweight loss
due to both dierences in elasticities between job types and discrepancies between
income and consumption shares of job types. The intuition is as follows. Note that
performance-pay workers, who are more elastic, have lower consumption share than
income share when p > 0 due to higher wage-rate risk. Suppose we increase progres-
sivity. Performance-pay workers will reduce their eort, which decreases both their
income (negative eect on available resources) and their consumption (positive eect
on available resources). Since their income share is higher than their consumption
share, aggregating both eects across all performance-pay workers leads to a negative
eect on available resources. The opposite is true for normal workers: their con-
sumption share is greater than income share, which means that on aggregate, there
are more available resources due to their responses. However, since performance-
pay workers are more elastic than normal workers, the former eect dominates and
increasing progressivity leads to an additional deadweight loss.
The next four terms are standard: the performance-pay eect, the redistribution
gains due to the the Pareto tail and due to the normal variance of productivities, and
the gain from insuring endogenous wage-rate risk at the performance-pay jobs net of
the crowd-out.
The last two terms are novel. They are present because the consumption share
of performance pay workers cm is potentially dierent from their population share π.
These terms correspond to various ways in which resources are redistributed between
job types. The rst of the two terms stands for the gain from insuring the job type
risk, that is, the risk of having a performance-pay job vs. a normal job. Recall that
this risk is exogenous. This term contributes to higher progressivity whenever there
is a dierence in mean consumption at the two job types.
The last term is related to the endogenous wage-rate risk. When taxes are pro-
gressive, higher wage-rate risk of performance-pay workers lowers their consumption
relative to normal workers. Consequently, changes in progressivity as well as endoge-
nous adjustments of the wage-rate risk will result in the transfers of resources across
job types via the government budget constraint. Suppose that the term in the big
brackets is positive, which is likely if p is not very high.29 Then, when progressiv-




ity increases, performance pay workers end up contributing more to the government
budget. This implies an additional redistribution from the performance-pay workers
to the normal workers. This eect contributes to higher (lower) progressivity if the
consumption share of performance-pay workers is higher (lower) than their population
share.
G Dynamic Model
In this section we extend our results to a dynamic model of the labor market. In
our setting, individuals live for several periods and sign a long-term labor contract
with a rm. We use the moral hazard model of Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik, and San-
nikov (2012) who extended Edmans and Gabaix (2011) to the multi-period environ-
ment. Workers' earnings can depend in an arbitrary way on their history of output
realizations. The government levies a labor income tax in each period and has a
redistributive social welfare objective.
G.1 Environment
Individuals are indexed by their exogenous and constant labor productivity θ ∈ Θ.
They live for S ≥ 2 periods, have time-separable preferences over consumption ct
and eort at with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). Throughout this section, we denote the
history of a random variable x up to time t ≤ S by xt ≡ {xs}1≤s≤t and let x0 = ∅.
Flow output at time t is given by:
yt = θ (at + ηt) , (66)
where {ηt}1≤t≤S are independent and identically distributed random variables. Through-
out the analysis we assume that the utility of consumption is logarithmic with isoe-
lastic disutility of labor, productivity θ is lognormally distributed with mean µθ and
variance σ2θ , and the performance shocks ηt are normally distributed with mean 0
and variance σ2η. As in Section 1, we assume that the agent chooses period-t eort at
after observing the realization of ηt. Therefore, the agent's strategy can be a function
at (η
t) of her history (including the current-period) of performance shocks.
εam,1−p >
ε




Firms discount future prots at rate r. For simplicity we assume that β (1 + r) =
1. In each period t they observe the agent's productivity θ and her output history yt
up to that date, but not her eort levels at or performance shocks ηt. A labor contract
species an eort level at (θ) in each period t, and an earnings function wt (θ, ηt) that
depends on the inferred history of performance shocks (given the recommended eort
levels) up to and including time t.
Finally, in each period, the government levies an income tax. We suppose that
the tax schedule has a constant and history-independent rate of progressivity p, so





The parameter τt ensures that the government balances its budget in each period.
Finally, we rule out private savings so that an agent with earnings wt in period t
consumes ct = Rt (wt).
G.2 Equilibrium Labor Contract
We start by setting up the contracting problem between the rm and a worker with
productivity θ. The operator Et denotes the expectation over all future performance
shock realizations {ηs}t+1≤s≤S conditional on ex-ante productivity θ and output his-
tory ηt.
Firm's problem. The rm's maximizes its expected prot







































































− h (at (θ))
)]
≥ U (θ) , (69)
where yt is given by (66) and U (θ) is the reservation value of workers with productivity
θ.
Equilibrium. We assume that there is free entry of rms, so that in equilibrium
prots are equal to zero:
Π (θ) = 0. (70)
This equation pins down the workers' reservation value U (θ).
Optimal Contract. We characterize the equilibrium contract in two steps: we rst
study its intertemporal, then its intratemporal, properties.
Lemma 3. The earnings process wt (θ, η
t) is a martingale. That is, expected period-t














Proof. See Appendix H.
This lemma characterizes the intertemporal properties of the optimal contract
between the rm and the worker. It is well known that the solution to dynamic
contracting models under separable utility satises the Inverse Euler Equation (see,
e.g., Rogerson (1985); Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003)). Intuitively, the
rm incurs a convex cost of providing eort incentives  giving xt utils in period t
requires paying a before-tax salary R−1t (u
−1 (xt)), where the cost function R
−1
t ◦u−1 ≡
Ct is convex. As a result, the optimal contract smooths out the cost of providing
incentives over time, which requires Et [C ′t (xt+1)] = C ′t (xt). Under the assumptions
that the utility function u is logarithmic and the retention function Rt is CRP, this
equation can be rewritten as (71).
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Proposition 5. Assume that eort is positive in each period, or that h′ (0) = 0.







as, and the sequences of




























where initial earnings are given by w0 ≡ δ1θA. The optimal period-t eort level at is




















is the elasticity of the pass-through parameter ψt with respect to eort














Proof. See Appendix H.
This proposition generalizes Corollary 1 to the dynamic setting and allows us
to characterize the intratemporal properties of the optimal compensation contract.
Equation (72) implies that earnings in each period t are a log-linear function of the
performance shock ηt in that period. The pass-through of performance shocks ηt to
log-earnings, ψt = ∂ logwt (θ, ·) /∂ηt, is increasing in the rate of progressivity p and
the optimal eort level at at time t. Note nally that the pass-throughs have the same
form as in the static model  we therefore expect the insight that the performance-pay
eect counteracts and osets a large share of the crowding-out eect to carry over to
the dynamic environment.
Formally, up to the optimal value of eort, the pass-through ψS in the terminal
period S is the same as in the optimal static contract (see equation (30)) since δS = 1.
In earlier periods, on the other hand, the exposure to risk for a given eort level is
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strictly smaller than in the static environment as the sensitivity parameters δt satisfy
δt < 1 for all t ≤ S − 1. To understand the intuition for this result, note that
equation (72) implies that an increase in the output realization yt  either due to
eort or to random shocks  boosts log-earnings in the current and future periods
equally. Indeed, since the agent is risk-averse it is ecient to spread the rewards over
her entire horizon. In other words, a given increase in lifetime utility necessary to
elicit higher eort requires a higher increase in ow utility if there are fewer remaining
periods over which to smooth these benets. As a result, the sequence {δt}1≤t≤S is
strictly increasing and the degree of performance-pay gets stronger over time.
G.3 Optimal Tax Progressivity
We nally characterize the optimal history-independent rate of progressivity p in the




U (θ) dF (θ) subject to period-by-period budget balance constraint that´
Θ
Rt (wt (θ, η
t)) dF (θ) ≥ 0.
















where εA,1−p is the elasticity of the present discounted value of eort A with respect




Proof. See Appendix H.
To compare the optimum rate of progressivity (75) to its static counterpart (43),
rst consider the benchmark environment with exogenous wage risk. That is, the
planner observes ex-ante earnings heterogeneity due to productivity shocks θ, and
ex-post heterogeneity due to performance shocks ηt passed through to earnings. In
particular, it observes that the degree of performance-pay rises with age, as described
in Proposition 5. However, it mistakenly believes that wage rates, and hence ψt, are
exogenous. That is, it assumes that εψs,as = εas,1−p = 0 for all s ≥ 1. In this case,
the dynamic optimal tax formula (75) is identical to the static formula (43), except
that the relevant labor supply elasticity is now the elasticity of the present-value of
eort, εA,1−p.
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Now consider the general model with ex-post earnings dispersion and endogenous
wage risk, captured by the non-zero elasticities εψs,as and εas,1−p. As in the static
model, the scal externality and welfare eect induced by the crowding-out eect
cancel each other out. The adjustment to the optimal rate of progressivity is given
by the second term in the denominator of (75). Recall that this term accounts for
the negative scal externality due to the performance-pay eect: a higher rate of
progressivity reduces eort in period s, hence reduces the dispersion of earnings which
in turn (by Jensen's inequality) negatively aects government revenue. This term
resembles the present value of the corresponding terms in the static model, with one
dierence. Namely, the relevant discount factor is not βs−1 but βs−1 δ1
δs
. Since δs
is increasing over time, this implies that the scal externalities caused by the future
performance-pay eects are discounted at a higher rate than the standard deadweight
losses from distorting eort.
H Proofs of Section G
Proof of Lemma 3. Starting from an incentive compatible allocation, consider the



















and ûs = u (R (ws (θ, ηs))) for all s /∈ {t− 1, t}. These perturbations preserve utility
and incentive compatibility since for all at−1

























The optimal allocation must be unaected by such deviations, so that






(1 + r)−t (ys −W (ûs))
]
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v′ (wt (θ, ηt−1, ηt))
| yt−1
]
= β (1 + r)
1
v′ (wt−1 (θ, ηt−1))
.
The inverse Euler equation (see Golosov, Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003)) holds in















which leads to equation (71) as β (1 + r) = 1.
Proof of Proposition 5. We provide a heuristic proof of this proposition, and the
formal argument follows the same steps as in Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik, and Sannikov
(2012). Assume that a unique level of eort is implemented at each time t, that these
eort levels are independent of previous output noise, and that local incentive con-
straints are sucient conditions. Consider rst the incentive compatibility constraint
which ensures that the worker does not wish to choose a dierent level of eort than
the one recommended by the rm. Consider a local deviation in eort at after history








































))) ∂w (θ, ηS−1, ηS)
∂ηS
= h′ (aS (θ)) .
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Fixing ηS−1 and integrating this incentive constraint over ηS (meaning over realiza-









= h′ (aS (θ)) ηS + z
S−1 (ηS−1)


















































))) ∂wS (θ, ηS)
∂ηS−1
= h′ (aS−1 (θ)) .













= h′ (aS−1 (θ)) ηS−1 + z
S−2 (ηS−2) .




is a linear function of ηS−1. Since the utility







= h′ (aS (θ)) ηS + z






























































This in turn implies































, is linear in ηS−1. More-
over, the last-period utility is linear in both ηS and ηS−1. By induction, we can show
that the utility in each period is a linear function of the performance shock in every
past period. Now suppose for simplicity of exposition that S = 2, β = 1, r = 0,
θ = 1, so that δ1 = 12 and δ2 = 1. From the arguments above we guess a log-linear
specication for earnings:
logw1 = ψ1η1 + k1
logw2 = ψ21η1 + ψ2η2 + k1 + k2.










total utility of the agent is given by
U = (1− p) [2ψ1η1 + ψ2y2 + 2k1 + k2]






































































where k′1 ≡ k1+ψ1a1−
σ2η
2
ψ21. This constant is pinned down by the zero prot condition
E [w1 + w2] = a1 + a2, that is, 2ek
′







which concludes the proof of equation (72). Equations (73) and (74) are derived in
the next proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. Recall that the earnings schedule is given by












The expected utility of workers with productivity θ is therefore equal to




























from which (74) easily follows. Thus, utilitarian social welfare is
ˆ
Θ





































































− βt−1h′ (at) ,
which easily implies equation (73). Now, the expected present value of pre-tax and


























respectively, so that expected government revenue in period t is equal to
ˆ
Θ






































Substituting this expression into the social welfare function
´
Θ
U (θ) dF (θ) implies
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Using the rst-order condition for eort derived above to simplify the left hand side






























































Moreover, we have 1 + εψs,1−p = 0. Substituting these two expressions into the
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This concludes the proof of equation (75).
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